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THE IMPACT OF THE WAR OVER THE
CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ON
THE BUSINESS OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
Sarah Helene Duggin
An intense public debate is raging over the vitality of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. This controversy erupted in reaction to policies
initiated by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), the United States
Sentencing Commission (USSC), and other federal law enforcement
agencies in recent years. These policies have prompted prosecutors and
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for their excellent editorial work on this article.
1. The first of these policies originated in a memorandum circulated to United
States Attorneys by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in 1999. Memorandum from
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against
Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/
Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. In 2003, Deputy Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson circulated an amended version of the Holder Memorandum.
Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of
Department Components, United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfl
corporateguidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. This guidance was
incorporated into the United States Attorneys Manual under the rubric of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, in CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL No. 162
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/
crm00162.htm.
The U.S.S.C.'s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines also address the subject of
corporate privilege waivers. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2004)
[hereinafter USSG MANUAL]. At the time of the symposium that generated this article,
the commentary to § 8C2.5 specifically permitted consideration of waiver of privilege
protections as a factor in assessing organizational cooperation in federal sentencing
proceedings. See id. On April 5, 2006, however, the USSC deleted this provision from
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other law enforcement personnel "routinely to pressure companies and other
organizations to waive their privileges as a condition of cooperation during
,,2investigations. Interestingly, this public dispute is not partisan in nature.
The DOJ fired the first salvos in the conflict during the Clinton
Administration, 3 and the Bush Administration Justice Department has
carried on and expanded the assault on the corporate attorney-client
privilege.4  In response, opposition to the government's controversial
measures has steadily gathered momentum, enlisting support from across the
political spectrum. The American Bar Association (ABA), the Corporate
Counsel Association, and the National Counsel of Defense Lawyers
(NACDL), as well as groups from outside the legal profession ranging from
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to the United States Chamber
of Commerce, have entered the fray, 5 along with members of Congress and
the commentary to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in response to intense
public pressure, particularly concerns that the language unduly encouraged organizations
to waive attorney-client and work product protections. Unless Congress disproves the
amendment, it will take effect on November 1, 2006. See USSC, Notice of Submission
to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines Effective Nov. 1, 2006, 71
Fed. Reg. 28,063 (May 15, 2006) at 59-60, http://www.USSC.gov/FEDREG/
2006finalnot.pdf [hereinafter USSC Proposed November 2006 Sentencing Guidelines
Amendments], and text infra accompanying notes 34-44 and 100-120. Although the
symposium presentation that generated this article took place prior to the USSC action,
insofar as possible, the text has been amended to reflect this change and subsequent
developments. Relevant events continue to occur, however, even as this article goes to
press.
2. Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, A.B.A., to Members (Jan. 31, 2006)
[hereinafter Greco Letter]. See also AM. CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, AsS'N OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL, BUSINESS CIVIL LIBERTIES, INC., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, FINANCIAL SERVICES
ROUNDTABLE, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM, NAT'L ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS,
NAT'L ASS'N OF MANUFACTURERS, NAT'L DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL ASS'N, RETAIL INDUSTRY
LEADERS ASS'N, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, & WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUND., THE
DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT, SURVEY
RESULTS PRESENTED TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, available at http://www.acca.com/
Surveys/attyclient2.pdf [hereinafter Attomey-Client Privilege Waiver Survey].
3. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued the first document setting forth
privilege waiver guidance to United States Attorneys in June 1999. See Holder
Memorandum, supra note 1. See generally Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate
Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COL.
BUS. L. REv. 859, 902-07 (2003).
4. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1.
5. By early 2005, an "informal coalition" (later denominated as the "Coalition to
Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege," see infra note 118) comprised of the American
Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union, Association of Corporate Counsel,
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prominent ex-DOJ officials. 6 The opposition recently scored a major victory
when the USSC voted to eliminate a provision in the commentary to the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines pertaining to consideration of
privilege waivers in assessing organizational cooperation as a mitigating
factor in sentencing.7 The battle, however, continues, particularly with
Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Round Table, Frontiers of Freedom, National
Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Washington Legal
Foundation [hereinafter Coalition] had become active in the debate. Letter from
Coalition to the Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chairman, USSC (Mar. 3, 2005). See infra
text accompanying notes 94-96 and 100-110. As A.B.A. Antitrust Section Chair Donald
Klawiter pointed out in testimony before the USSC in November 2005, the "remarkable
political and philosophical diversity of that coalition. . . shows just how widespread these
concerns have been in the business, legal and public policy communities." Donald C.
Klawiter, Chair, Antitrust, A.B.A., Statement before the United States Sentencing
Commission (Nov. 15, 2005) available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/
materials/050/050.pdf [hereinafter Klawiter Testimony]. Several professional journals
have taken editorial positions or presented bar officials' opinions on the matter. See, e.g.,
James E. Heiting, Confidentiality Under Siege, CAL. BAR J. (Mar. 2006) (column by
president of California Bar opposing government waiver policies on grounds that
"[a]ttorney-client privilege and confidentiality are the foundations of trust and confidence
in counsel historically and rightfully recognized as fundamental"); Editorial, NEW JERSEY
LAW JOURNAL, Vol. CLXXXIII - No. 4-index 214 (Jan. 23, 2006) ("[A]ny government
request for, or consideration of, a waiver is bad policy. We cannot afford to be silent as
the government encroaches upon these bedrock principles"); John Caher, Bar Task Force
Fights Waivers of Privilege, N.Y.L.J. at 1 (Mar. 28, 2006) (reporting New York Bar
Association's "call[] on the U.S. Sentencing Commission to abandoned a policy that
encourages corporate criminal defendants to waive the attorney-client and work product
privileges to obtain more lenient sentences"). The issue also has begun to attract
attention in the mainstream media. See generally, Gary Fields, Sentencing Panel Adds
Hurdle for Companies to Get Leniency, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2004, at B3; Lori P. Cohen,
In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees; as
Sentencing Rules Stiffen KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won't Pay Their Legal Costs; What
Cooperation Entails, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A l.
6. Letter from former United States DOJ Officials to the USSC (Aug. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/dojlettertoussc.pdf. The signatories are:
former Attorneys General Griffin B. Bell, Edwin Meese, Ill, and Dick Thornburgh;
former Acting Attorney General Stuart M. Gerson; former Deputy Attorneys General
Carol E. Dinkins and George J. Terwilliger, Il; and former Solicitors General Kenneth
W. Starr, Theodore B. Olson, and Seth P. Waxman. Id. See also infra text accompanying
notes 117-20.
7. See supra note 1 and text infra accompanying notes 121-27. See generally Terry
Carter, Privilege Waiver Policy Dumped But Federal Prosecutors May Still Seek Waivers
from Corporations, A.B.A. J. REPORT, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/
joumal/ereport/al4privil.html; Marcia Coyle, Business Coalition Wins Big on Thorny
Waiver Issue, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 2006, at 4; lan Goldrich, United States: U.S.
Sentencing Commission to Rescind Guideline that Conditions Sentencing Leniency on
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respect to policies that permit privilege waiver demands by DOJ, the SEC,
the HHS Inspector General and other federal law enforcement authorities.
Health care providers and medical professionals have a great deal at stake
in the debate over attorney-client and work product protections. Few areas
of endeavor are steeped so deeply in labyrinthine regulations and convoluted
statutory provisions as American health care, and even fewer involve such
high stakes-literally life and death-on a daily basis. The ability to consult
with counsel in confidence about legal questions pertaining to the provision
of medical services is essential to health care entities and to the medical
professionals who provide health care services in association with these
organizations.
The purpose of this article is to review the current dispute over the
corporate attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and to explore
its impact on the provision of health care. The article's principal thesis is
that a strong attorney-client privilege, along with robust work product
protection, is critical to the business of health care, the quality of medical
services, and the effective enforcement of federal and state health care laws.
Part I begins with a brief account of the origins and scope of the conflict
between federal law enforcement policies and the corporate attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine in recent years. Part II then turns to a
discussion of the intricate web of laws governing health care services and
the role of counsel in facilitating understanding of, and adherence to, these
laws. Part III explains why the corporate attorney-client privilege is
essential to the business of American health care, concluding that health care
providers, professionals and counsel need to engage in the debate and
exercise constant vigilance to protect the corporate attorney-client privilege.
I. THE BATTLE OVER THE ONGOING VITALITY OF THE CORPORATE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Nature of the Privilege in Organizational Settings
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that corporate
entities, like individuals, are entitled to invoke the protections of the
attorney-client privilege. In 1981, in its seminal decision in Upjohn Co. v.
United States,8 the Court addressed the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine in a corporate setting pursuant to Rule 501 of the
Waivers of Attorney-Client Privilege, MONDAQ BusINEss BRIEFING, May 4, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 7689735; Susan R. Miller, Unusual Coalition Works to Defend
Attorney-Client Privilege, ST. Louis DAILY RECORD/ST. Louis COUNTIAN, Apr. 26, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 7168251.
8. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Spring 2006] Impact of the War Over the 305
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 The underlying dispute arose when the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) subpoenaed questionnaires sent by Upjohn's General
Counsel to employees in locations around the world in the course of an
internal investigation of possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. 10 Upjohn moved to quash an IRS administrative subpoena on grounds
that it called for materials protected by the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine." Both the District Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled against the company. 2 The District
Court concluded that Upjohn had waived its attorney-client privilege. 13 The
Second Circuit ruled that the attorney-client privilege protected only
exchanges among the corporation's "control group"-Upjohn's counsel and
senior executives who had responsibility for the company's responses to the
9. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. For discussion of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine in corporate settings, see A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT 3-7 [hereinafter A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT], available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf, Douglas R.
Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the
Post-Enron Era, 100 PENN ST. L. REV. 381 (2005); PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.14 (2d ed., supp. 2005); JOHN K. VILLA, CORPORATE
COUNSEL GUIDELINES §§ 1.01-1.03 (1999, supp. 2005). For accounts of the erosion of
these protections, see The American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations,
41 DUQUESNE L. REV. 307 (2003); Duggin, supra note 3, at 899-907; David M. Zornow
& Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in
Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2000).
10. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 388; see Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m)(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-l-2 (2000)).
11. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 388.
12. Id. (citing United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225-27 (2d Cir. 1979)).
13. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 388 (citing United States v. Upjohn Co., 1978 WL 1221
(W.D. Mich. 1978)).
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relevant legal advice-and held that the work product doctrine was
inapplicable to administrative summonses.
14
The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favor of Upjohn, focusing on the
important policy interests served by the attorney-client privilege and work
product protections. With respect to the attorney-client privilege, the
majority reasoned that the Second Circuit's approach "frustrate[d] the very
purpose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal
advice to the client corporation."'' 5 The Court emphasized that "if the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and
client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected." 16 The Court explained that this is
particularly true in the corporate setting, for "corporations, unlike most
individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law."
' 7
The Court reached similar conclusions in siding with Upjohn with respect
to the applicability of the work product doctrine in corporate settings.
Emphasizing the importance of permitting lawyers to keep their work
confidential, the Court reiterated the policies underlying its original
recognition of the work product doctrine in its 1947 decision in Hickman v.
Taylor.18 Noting the subsequent reaffirmation of the Hickman rationale in
United States v. Nobles 19 and the incorporation of the work product doctrine
into Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
pointedly observed that "if the discovery of the material sought were
permitted 'much of what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten."' 2 1 "Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial.. These developments, in turn, would demoralize lawyers and
adversely affect "the interests of the clients and the cause of justice. 23
In reaching these conclusions, the Court focused particularly on the need
for the availability of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
in the context of corporate compliance initiatives. It rejected the Second
14. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 388 (citing Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1227).
15. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392.
16. Id. at 393.
17. Id. at 392 (quoting Bryson P. Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAW 901, 913 (1969)).
18. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
21. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 398 (quoting 329 U.S. at 511).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Circuit's analysis of the attorney-client privilege, reasoning that the lower
court's approach "not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to
formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal
problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel
to ensure their client's compliance with the law."24 The Court specifically
disagreed with the government's contention that corporations would seek
legal advice solely because of the risk of liability if they did not do so,
opining that the government's position "ignore[d] the fact that the depth and
quality of any investigations to ensure compliance with the law would
suffer, even were they undertaken. 25
In the more than thirty years since the Upjohn ruling the Court has
continued to affirm the ongoing vitality of the privileges, carving out few
26exceptions. At the same time, the privileges have become increasingly
important to organizations in light of expanded criminal prosecution of
corporations and other entities 7 and the emergence of the internal
investigation as a critical tool for companies seeking to keep on the right
side of the law in an increasingly complex legal environment. 28  In the
1990's anti-fraud initiatives netted a number of major corporate players,
including health care and pharmaceutical companies such as Caremark,
SmithKline Beecham and Columbia/HCA. 29 Since the subsequent fall of
Enron, WorldCom and other corporate giants, 30 and the appointment of a
Presidential Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002,3 1 criminal and civil
24. Id. at 392.
25. Id. at 393 n.2.
26. For general discussion of the operation of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine in corporate contexts, as well as exceptions to these protections, see
sources cited supra note 9.
27. See Duggin, supra note 3, at 874.
28. Seeid at 871-92.
29. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, HealthSouth Inquiry Expands to Medicare, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at C I; Milt Freudenheim, SmithKline Beecham in Settlement with
US., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at 37; Barnaby J. Feder, Caremark to Pay $161 Million
in Accord, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1995, at 2.
30. See generally Gabriel L. Imperato, Corporate Crime and Compliance: What
Does the Government Expect?, FED. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 25 (corporate scandals
precipitated "enforcement actions aimed at curbing corporate malfeasance"); Duggin,
supra note 3, at 861-62, 877 n. 75. See also Stephen Labaton, Crime and Consequences
Still Weigh on Corporate World; Four Years Later, Enron's Shadow Lingers as Change
Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at C1.
31. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 245 (2003), reprinted as amended in 28
U.S.C. § 509 (Supp. II 2004) (Establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task Force).
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enforcement actions against organizations have become commonplace.
32
Shareholders' derivative actions and other civil lawsuits seeking to impose
personal liability on directors, trustees and officers of troubled entities for
failure to satisfy their fiduciary obligations and oversight responsibilities
have kept pace with government enforcement actions.
33
B. The Government's Extra-judicial Efforts to Limit Assertion of the
Corporate Privilege
Despite the loss in Upjohn, the government did not give up on its efforts
to limit the availability of attorney-client and work product protections in
connection with enforcement initiatives. Before long the war over the
corporate privilege resumed, but this time the principal theaters were outside
the courtroom.
1. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
In 1991, the USSC issued its Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.
34
The Organizational Guidelines, like those applicable to individual
defendants in criminal proceedings, are designed to assign culpability scores
to defendants based on the severity of their offenses and various mitigating
and aggravating factors. 35 A key section of the guidelines provides that an
entity may lower its culpability score by demonstrating that it had an
effective compliance program in place when the offense occurred, 36 or that it
responded to discovery of a violation by "[s]elf-[r]eporting, [c]ooperation,
32. See Duggin, supra note 3 at 874-80. See Christopher A. Wray, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
Crim. Div., DOJ, Remarks at the A.B.A. White Collar Crime Luncheon 3 (Feb. 25,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press-room/speeches/2005_3853
_rmrkCrimLuncheon030205.pdf (stating that in its first two years the President's
Corporate Fraud Task Force has "(1) Obtained over 600 corporate fraud convictions; and
(2) Charged over 990 defendants-and convicted 77 corporate CEOs and presidents-
with some type of corporate fraud crime, in connection with over 480 charged cases").
See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, tbl. 51, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/SBTOC03.htm.
(reporting on sentencing of 200 organizations in a one-year period from October 2002
through September 2003).
33. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001). See generally Duggin, supra note
3, at 881-84.
34. USSG MANUAL, supra note I, at ch. 8, introductory cmt. and § 8AlI.1
35. Id. at § 8C2.5.
36. Id. at § 8C2.5(f)
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and [a]cceptance of [r]esponsibility." 37 While ultimate assessment of these
factors rests with the courts in cases that actually proceed to sentencing,
these provisions afford prosecutors powerful leverage, particularly with
respect to evaluation of an entity's "cooperation.
'" 38
In November 2004, the Sentencing Commission enhanced the power of
prosecutors to wield this tool when it added a new provision to the
commentary to Section 8C2.5 of the guidelines stating: "[w]aiver of
attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite
to a reduction in culpability score. . . unless such waiver is necessary in
order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information
known to the organization."39 While the language of the provision appeared
to restrict the use of privilege waiver demands, in practice it served to
legitimize frequent, broad-based waiver demands. Consequently, the
incorporation of this language into the commentary to the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines sparked heated debate.4 °
In January 2005, the Supreme Court held mandatory imposition of the
guidelines unconstitutional in United States v. Booker.41 The Court ruled,
however, that the guidelines could be employed in an advisory capacity
without violating the Constitution. Although their application was no
longer mandatory, the guidelines continued to exert significant influence on
the criminal justice system.43 Consequently, the November 2004 addition of
37. Id. at § 8C2.5(g)
38. See Duggin, supra note 3, at 899-909; Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 9, at 154-
56.
39. USSG MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 8C2.5, application note 12 (emphasis
supplied). The USSC has since voted to eliminate this provision. See supra note I.
40. In February 2005, the A.B.A. wrote to the Chairman of the USSC that the "new
privilege waiver amendment, though perhaps well intentioned, will have a number of
negative unintended consequences, including the likelihood that companies and other
organizations will be forced to waive their attomey-client and work product protections
on a routine basis." Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director A.B.A. Gov't Affrs. Ofc. to
the Hon. Howard Coble, Chairman, USSC (Feb. 9, 2005) at 2. Subsequent comments on
the impact of the new provision echoed this prediction and asserted that it had become a
reality. See infra text accompanying notes 101-114.
41. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
42. Id. at 226-27.
43. According to the USSC, as of the most recent data available in March 2006,
"[t]he majority of federal cases continue to be sentenced in conformance with the
sentencing guidelines." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF US. V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, vi (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker
-report/Booker Report.pdf. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, The Amended Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines: Top Ten Things Attorneys Should Know, 42 Hous. LAW. 10, 11
(March/April 2005) (noting that Booker is unlikely significantly to affect courts' use of
the Organizational Guidelines); Neil Weinberg, Lock 'Em Up, FORBES, Jan. 30, 2006, at
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the waiver language to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines• • 44
commentary remained controversial. 4
2. DOJ Policy on Privilege Waivers
DOJ's extra-judicial attack on the corporate attorney-client and work
product protections began in earnest in 1999 when Eric Holder, Deputy
Attorney General during the latter part of the Clinton Administration, issued
a memorandum to United States Attorneys addressing the filing of criminal
charges against corporate entities.45 When Deputy Attorney General Larry
Thompson took office during the George W. Bush Administration, he
reissued the Holder Memorandum with minor changes.46 Shortly thereafter,
DOJ incorporated the Thompson Memorandum into the United States
Attorneys' Manual under the heading of Federal Prosecutions of Business• 47
Organizations. These documents instruct prosecutors that in deciding
whether to charge a corporate entity, the "corporation's timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate" with the
government's investigation may be relevant factors.48  Most importantly,
"[iln gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor may
consider the corporation's willingness to... disclose the complete results of
48a (reporting that since the Supreme Court's Booker decision, "little has changed.
Under the voluntary regime 62% of 46,470 federal criminal sentences remained within
the guidelines for the ten months through October [2005] versus 68% the previous four
years. In only 8% of cases did judges cite the high court's decision while departing from
the guidelines."). But see David J. D'Addio, Note, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact
of Appellate Review on Defendants' Rights, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 174 (2006)
(predicting that reasonableness reviews of sentences by federal courts will gradually
create new "reasonableness ranges" for offenses raising the same kinds of conceptual
Sixth Amendment difficulties that led to the Booker decision).
44. See supra note 7 and infra text accompanying notes 97-120.
45. Holder Memorandum, supra note 1.
46. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1. The Thompson Memorandum is
discussed from a prosecutorial perspective in Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective
Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 587 (2004). Ms. Buchanan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Pennsylvania and Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys at the time she
wrote the article, also defends the government's waiver policies against commonly
advanced criticisms and argues that many of these objections are far less serious than
their proponents suggest. See id.
47. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, in
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL No. 162 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia_reading roojm/usam/title9/crmOO162.htm.
48. Holder Memorandum, supra note 1, at II.A.4.
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its internal investigation, and to waive the attorney-client and work-product
privileges. -49 The same kinds of factors apply to reporting on corporate
cooperation in connection with sentencing. In particular,
[o]ne factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy
of a corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure
including, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work
product protections, both with respect to its internal investigation
and with respect to communications between specific officers,
directors, and employees.
50
When he took office in late 2003, then Deputy Attorney General James
Comey endorsed his predecessors' approach. 5 1 As Richard Janis observed in
a 2005 article in the Washington Lawyer, "the government has continued to
redefine what it means by 'full cooperation,' with each successful demand
,,52acting as the new baseline for what is expected in future cases. One DOJ
official noted, "you'll get a lot of credit if you cooperate, and that credit can
make the difference between life and death for a corporation.
'" 53
49. Id. at VI.A (emphasis added).
50. Id. at VI cmt.
51. N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal
Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice Is Being Destroyed, WASHINGTON
LAWYER, March 2005, at 34 ("[I]f anything, [Mr. Comey] espoused an even stronger
approach."). Cf James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Remarks to the A.B.A. 14th
Annual Institute on Health Care Fraud (May 13, 2004), in 53 U.S. ATTORNEYS' BULL. 4
(noting frequent need for cooperating corporation to waive work product protection).
52. Janis, supra note 51, at 35. Mr. Janis also quotes Alabama United States
Attorney Alice Martin to the effect that "[o]nce one prosecutor has gotten cooperation of
a certain level, that level becomes what we all now consider cooperation." Id (quoting
Cohen, supra note 5). As a senior DOJ official has acknowledged, "[t]o avoid any such
disclosures unnecessarily, experienced attorneys will refrain from including mental
impressions and strategy in their notes of witness interviews." Buchanan, supra note 46,
at 596 (citing Comey, supra note 51, at 5).
53. Wray, supra note 32, at 4. As discussed more fully below, however, Mr.
McCallum has instructed all United States Attorneys Offices to create written policies in
a concession to concerns of the defense bar, industry and public interest groups. See
infra text accompanying notes 97-99. Cf John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men, Corporate
Lawyers Worry that They're Doing the Government's Bidding While Doing Internal
Investigations, 89 A.B.A. J. 46, June 2003 (defense lawyers expressing view that
companies bear the burden of attorney-client privilege waivers); DOJ Enron Task Force
leader Leslie Ragon Caldwell has reportedly stated, "[y]ou don't have to waive your
attorney-client privilege, but we want you to." (quoted in Gibeaut, supra note 53, at 1).
See infra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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3. Policies Implemented by Other Federal Agencies
A number of federal agencies, including the Officer of the Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have approached the attorney-
client and work product protections in a similar fashion in connection with
voluntary disclosure programs and negotiation of enforcement matters. The
SEC has encouraged the production of otherwise privileged materials in a
variety of contexts for many years.5 4 The Office of the Inspector General of
HHS reportedly has successfully implemented this strategy in connection
with a number of its anti-fraud initiatives in the health care arena, 55 and
other federal agencies reportedly increasingly have begun to follow suit.
56
54. The SEC specifically has noted:
In some cases, the desire to provide information to the Commission staff may
cause companies to consider choosing not to assert the attorney-client
privilege, the work product protection and other privileges, protections and
exemptions with respect to the Commission. The Commission recognizes
that these privileges, protections and exemptions serve important social
interests. In this regard, the Commission does not view a company's waiver
of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) to
provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the Commission staff.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 2 1(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions at n.3, Exchange Act Release No.
44,969, Accounting and Audit Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter "SEC Cooperation Report"], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
investreport/34-44969.htm.
55. See, e.g., Notices, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of Inspector
General, Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg.
58399-02 (Oct. 30, 1998) at pt. VI (noting that in verifying self-disclosures OIG requires
"access to all audit work papers and other supporting documents without the assertion of
privileges or limitations on the information produced"). Id. Also, while the protocol
mentions that OIG does not ordinarily request production of materials subject to the
attorney-client privilege, it may require production of some privileged documents,
particularly those otherwise subject to the work product privilege. The protocol goes on
to state, however, that "OIG is prepared to discuss with provider's counsel ways to gain
access to the underlying information without the need to waive the protections provided
by an appropriately asserted claim of privilege." Id.
56. See also, A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 16-18; Letter from Steven
R. Schell to A.B.A. Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege (Feb. 10, 2005) at 2,
available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/publichearing2005021 /testimony/
20050211000000.pdf (describing joint EPA/DOJ practices requiring waiver of attorney-
client privilege protection for investigative reports prepared in response to EPA civil
notices of likelihood of violation of environmental laws).
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As a result, privilege waivers are often a practical prerequisite for resolution
of enforcement matters in negotiations with federal agencies.
57
It is difficult for corporations to refuse to comply with government
demands for privilege waivers when the government treats a refusal to turn
over privileged materials as uncooperative behavior. 58 The results can range
from prosecution of a marginal case to representations to a court that a
corporate defendant's culpability score should not be reduced despite helpful
actions in a variety of other areas. 59 As Donald Klawiter, Chair of the ABA
Antitrust Law Section, recently testified before the USSC, companies have
little choice in responding to privilege waiver demands "because the
government's threat to label them 'uncooperative' in combating corporate
crime would profoundly threaten their public image, stock price, and credit
worthiness. In light of the severity of the potential consequences, refusal
to agree to privilege waiver demands could arguably constitute fiduciary
61violations on the part of corporate decision makers. Consequently, the
insistence of law enforcement authorities on privilege waivers and the
reluctant acquiescence of corporations and other entities in their demands
inflamed an existing conflict on a second front - the battle over third-party
access to materials disclosed to government agencies.
4. The Secondary Skirmish Over Selective Waiver
The selective waiver conflict pits individuals and entities who have
voluntarily disclosed otherwise privileged materials to law enforcement
authorities against third-party litigants seeking access to these materials in
related civil litigation--e.g., plaintiffs in civil fraud or professional
malpractice cases. One of the more widely publicized cases centered on
57. See Mark Robeck, Amy Vazquez & Michael E. Clark, Corporate Cooperation in
the Face of Government Investigations, 17 No. 2 H. LAW. 20, 24-25 (2005); Janis, supra
note 51, at 34-35.
58. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. The report states: "As a
practical matter, corporations rarely can resist prosecutorial requests for disclosure,
because of the harsh consequences of having to defend against criminal charges, and
because, in cases where criminal charges are brought and sustained, corporations depend
on the leniency in sentencing that results from providing assistance satisfactory to the
prosecution." Id.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Klawiter Testimony, supra note 5, at 6. See infra text accompanying notes 104-
05.
61. Corporate directors and officers have a duty pursuant to state law to act in good
faith in the best interests of their corporations. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Code §
8.30(a).
62. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Philippines, 951 F. 2d 1414 (3d Cir.
1992); (holding "that by disclosing documents to the SEC and to the DOJ, Westinghouse
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the efforts of fallen health care giant Columbia/HCA to preclude insurance
companies and other plaintiffs in private civil actions from gaining access to
audit reports the company had produced to DOJ officials pursuant to a
63written confidentiality agreement. Columbia/HCA argued for application
of the principle that has come to be known as the "selective waiver
doctrine." 64 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit first
recognized this principle in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith61 in
holding that voluntary disclosure to government agencies does not
necessarily waive attorney-client or work product protections for all
66 67purposes. Other courts have rejected this approach however. The Third
Circuit, for example, emphatically stated in its noted decision in
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Philippines that "an exception for
disclosures to government agencies is not necessary to further the [work
product] doctrine's purpose; attorneys are still free to prepare their cases
without fear of disclosure to an adversary as long as they and their clients
refrain from making such disclosures themselves."
69
waived both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine with respect to
those documents"); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (rejecting selective waiver claim on grounds that doctrine does not serve purposes
of underlying privilege protections).
63. In re Columbia/HCA Billing Practices, 293 F.3d 289, 292 (6th Cir. 2002).
64. See generally, e.g., Jeremy Bums, Selective Waiver in the Era of Privilege
Uncertainty, 5 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 14 (2005); Richmond, supra note 9, at 406-14;
Andrew J. McNally, Comment, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Voluntary
Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party Access to Disclosed
Materials, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 823, (2005); Jody E. Okrzesik, Note, Selective
Waiver: Should the Government Be Privy to Privileged Information Without Waiving the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine?, 34 MEMPHIS L. REV. 115 (2003);
A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-13; RICE, supra note 9, § 4.14.
65. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. Id. at 611.
67. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices, 293 F.3d 289
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681 (lst Cir. 1997);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991);
Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Most recently, the
Tenth Circuit joined the courts that have rejected the selective waiver concept in In re
Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006); see generally Tenth
Circuit Rejects Selective Waiver, Finds Privilege Lost by Release to Agencies, 74 U.S. L.
WK. 1772 (2006). See generally A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-13;
Bums, supra note 64, at text accompanying notes 54-67; Okrzesik, supra note 64, at 128-
41.
68. 951 F.2dat 1429.
69. Id. at 1429. The court reasoned that:
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In the Columbia/HCA matter, the Sixth Circuit held that an entity that
provides privileged materials to government regulators, even pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement, forfeits attomey-client and work product
protections as to all communications on the subject.70 In the court's view,
"any form of selective waiver... transforms the attorney-client privilege into
merely another brush on an attomey's palette, utilized and manipulated to
gain tactical or strategic advantage. Moreover, because it can be difficult
to draw any boundaries once the doctrine is applied; selective waiver invites
"a difficult and fretful linedrawing process." The court also admonished
the DOJ for entering into the confidentiality agreement in the first place,
stating: "The investigatory agencies of the Government should act to bring
to light illegal activities, not to assist wrongdoers in concealing the
information from the public domain." 73  Nevertheless, some federal
agencies, including the SEC, continue to support the concept of selective
waiver and to enter into confidentiality agreements with individuals and
entities who have agreed to disclose privileged materials in the context of
enforcement proceedings.
74
Only one federal circuit has recognized the selective waiver doctrine.
Several circuits agree with the Sixth Circuit that even confidentiality
[c]reating an exception for disclosures to government agencies may actually
hinder the operation of the work-product doctrine. If internal investigations
are undertaken with an eye to later disclosing the results to a government
agency, the outside counsel conducting the investigation may hesitate to
pursue unfavorable information or legal theories about the corporation. Thus,
allowing a party to preserve the doctrine's protection while disclosing work
product to a government agency could actually discourage attorneys from
fully preparing their cases.
Id. at 1429-30.
70. 293 F.3d at 302-03.
71. Id. at 302-03 (citing In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 253 (2d Cir.
1993).
72. Id. at 303.
73. Id. at 303.
74. For example, in October 2001, the SEC stated:
The Commission recently filed an amicus brief arguing that the provision of
privileged information to the Commission staff pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement did not necessary waive the privilege as to third parties. ..
Moreover, in certain circumstances, the Commission staff has agreed that a
witness' production of privileged information would not constitute a subject
matter waiver that would entitle the staff to receive further privileged
information.
SEC Cooperation Report, supra note 54, at n.3 (citing Brief of SEC as Amicus Curiae,
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 99-C-7980-3 (Ga. Ct. App., filed May 13, 2001)).
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agreements are not dispositive of third-party access rights, ruling that law
enforcement officials cannot agree to maintain confidentiality at the expense
of third parties once an individual or entity waives attorney-client or work
product protections. 75 A bill introduced in Congress in 2004 would have
protected documents provided to the SEC pursuant to confidentiality
76
agreements from disclosure to third parties, but the bill died in committee.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the selective waiver doctrine,
nor is the issue settled in the state courts. In June 2006, however, the U.S.
Judicial Conference Adversary Committee on Evidence Rules proposed-
with the unanimous support of its members-amending Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 to provide that disclosures to federal authorities in the course
of "regulatory, investigative or enforcement" proceedings would "not
operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of non-
governmental persons or entities. ' 77 If adopted and subsequently enacted by
Congress, this provision could have a major impact on third-party civil
litigation related to the subject of federal investigations. Nevertheless, at
present, it is impossible to assure that materials disclosed to law enforcement
agencies will be protected from disclosure to third parties, even if the
disclosure takes place pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. As Judge
Boggs noted in his dissent in Columbia/HCA, the absence of a strong
selective waiver doctrine "does nothing more than increase the cost of
cooperating with the government." 78 The proposed amendment to Rule 502
offers hope, but unless and until it is adopted, the majority of federal courts
are likely to continue to reject the selective waiver concept. The refusal of
most courts to adopt a selective waiver doctrine raises the stakes for entities
75. Compare Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978), with cases cited
supra note 67. The Tenth Circuit's very recent decision in Qwest Communications offers
a survey of earlier precedents and a thoughtful analysis of the relevant issues. See 450
F.3d at 1179.
76. See The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2004, H.R.
2179, 108th Cong. § 4, cited in Burns, supra note 64, at n. 10. A.B.A. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 12-13.
77. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference (June 2006) at 3 &
App. A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf. As the
report notes, implementation of the change would requires legislative action. Id. at 1.
See generally Evidence-Privileged Communications Change to Evidence Rule Would
Allow Partial Waiver to Governmental Agencies, 75 U.S. L. WK. 2007 (2006).
78. 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Judge Boggs expressed the view that the
"public interest in easing government investigations counsels against holding the
attorney-work-product privilege waived when the holder of the privilege discloses
privileged information to the government." Id. at 314.
Spring 2006] Impact of the War Over the 317
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
facing federal law enforcement agency demands for waiver of attorney-
client privilege and work product protections.
C. Efforts by the Legal Profession and Others to Defend the Corporate
Privileges
Not long after its issuance in June 1999, the Holder Memorandum began
to impact prosecutorial decisions and enforcement actions across the
country. There are good reasons for the government's desire to obtain
otherwise privileged materials from corporations and other entities that are
defendants or potential defendants in criminal actions or enforcement
proceedings. As the Holder and Thompson memoranda suggest, obtaining
privileged materials enables government attorneys to gain greater certainty
about the legitimacy of an entity's cooperation. Access to this information
allays concerns that a defendant may mask particularly egregious conduct by
cooperating with respect to matters already unearthed by the government.
Insisting on privilege waivers also provides a means of leveraging
prosecutorial resources. Waivers allow the government to gather facts
rapidly by gaining access to the work of defense attorneys and the fruits of
their investigations Consequently, the government continued to seek to
circumvent Upjohn.
Demanding privilege waivers as a precondition to acknowledging
corporate "cooperation" proved to be a successful strategy for the
government. As David Zornow and Keith Krakaur noted in 2000, "[w]ith
this change in prosecutorial attitude, the government effectively [began to]
deputiz[e] 'Corporate America' as an arm of law enforcement at the expense
of principles that lie at the core of our adversarial system of justice." 80
Before long, other members of the defense bar complained that the attorney-
client privilege is "under siege," 81 and that the privilege that "help[ed] to
define the role of lawyers in society and the public's perception of the
79. See, e.g., Comey, supra note 51, at 4 (noting that, among other things,
"[clooperation enables the government to gather the facts before they're stale... fully
investigat[e] the wrongdoing and figure[e] out who the wrongdoers are"); Zomow &
Krakaur, supra note 9, at 157 (noting that waiver of corporate privilege protections
enables the government to "obtain incriminating evidence directly from employees
without the need to negotiate promises of immunity or to arrange for a plea to a lesser
charge in exchange for information" and "reaps the fruits of interviews while minimizing
the risk that the employees will seek to obtain separate counsel who might otherwise have
advised them to assert the Fifth Amendment").
80. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 9, at 147. See also, e.g., Andrew Longstreth,
Double Agent: In the New Era of Internal Investigations, Defense Lawyers Have Become
Deputy Prosecutors, 27 AM. LAW. No. 2 (Feb. 2005).
81. Criminal Law-White Collar Crime: Programs Examine Trend Toward Seeking
Corporate Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, 71 U.S.L.W. 2625, 2635 (2003).
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fairness with which the legal system operates. . . [were] being irreparably
destroyed by the government's successful assault on centuries of
tradition."8 2 In a similar vein, journalist John Gibeaut reported that "waiver
and disclosure [came to be] a lot like voting in Chicago elections:
Corporations must do it early and often, or be treated as uncooperative.
'" 83
In response, critics of the government's privilege waiver policies began to
stress two key points: (1) the privilege waiver policies of DOJ and other
agencies undermine safeguards critical to the American justice system; and
(2) in the longer run, these kinds of policies are likely to constrict the flow of
information to law enforcement officials.
84
1. Engagement by the ABA and Other Interested Parties
In September 2004, while government attorneys continued to clash with
the defense bar over privilege waivers, the ABA appointed a special task
force to address the issue.§5 The Task Force on the Attorney-Client
Privilege was charged with the responsibility "to evaluate issues and
recommend policy related to the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine. ' 86 The Task Force engaged in extensive research into the matter
and conducted hearings. 87  In May 2005 the Task Force published a
comprehensive report on its efforts. 88  The report recounted numerous
examples of prosecutorial pressure on corporate entities to waive their
attorney-client and work product protections, stating: "The Task Force heard
from a variety of sources that, whether made overtly or implicitly, these
requests, backed by an express or implied threat of harsh treatment for
82. Janis, supra note 51, at 44. See also, e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin,
DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 4, 2003, at 1; Gibeaut, supra note 53 at 48.
83. Id. at 51. See also Richard Ben-Veniste & Raj De, Federal Privilege Waiver
Demands Impact Corporate Compliance, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1.
84. See generally A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 18-20. In February
2006, the A.B.A. Task Force circulated a memorandum proposing specific changes in the
McCallum and Thompson memoranda. Suggested Revisions to Department of Justice
Policy Concerning Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protections
(Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/acprivmemo21006.pdf.
85. See Press Release, A.B.A. President Robert Grey Creates Task Force to
Advocate for Attorney-Client Privilege, Oct. 6, 2004 http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
attorneyclient/materials/pressrelease.pdf.
86. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id.
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refusing, have become increasingly common." 89  Emphasizing that the
attorney-client privilege "fosters the attorney-client relationship,"
"encourages client candor," "fosters voluntary legal compliance," "promotes
efficiency in the legal system," and "enhances the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel, '9° the Task Force concluded that the
pressures exerted by DOJ and other federal agencies, as well as the
November 2004 amendments to the Commentary to section 8C2.5 of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,91 threatened these important goods.
The Task Force agreed with the observations of a California Bar committee
that in the longer run "[p]ressure on corporations to waive client
confidentiality protections thus creates additional risks of harm to investors
and innocent targets of investigation and, even to the public itself.92 In
response to the Task Force's report and recommendations, on August 9,
2005, the ABA's House of Delegates adopted a resolution opposing "the
routine practice [ofi government officials of seeking to obtain a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine through the granting or
denial of any benefit or advantage."
9
During the same time period, other interest groups began to engage in
attempts to stem the tide of privilege waiver demands. In March 2005, an
informal coalition of business and civil liberties groups94 wrote to the
Honorable Ricardo Hinojosa, Chairman of the USSC, to express their view
that privilege waiver demands and the November 2004 amendment to the
commentary to Section 8C2.5 of the Organizational Guidelines were
"weaken[ing] the attorney-client privilege between companies and their
lawyers," "undermin[ing] internal compliance programs," and "unfairly
89. Id. at 14. For discussion of federal law enforcement practices with respect to
privilege waiver, see id at 14-16 (prosecutorial policies) and 16-18 (regulatory agency
practices).
90. Id. at 7-11.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
92. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 19 (quoting Corporations
Committee, Business Law Section, The State Bar of California, "At Every Peril" New
Pressures on the Attorney-Client Relationship, Nov. 13, 2003 at 4).
93. Informal Coalition Letter of Mar. 3, 2005 to the Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa,
available at http://www.USSC.gov/HEARINGS.HTM and http://www.aclu.org/;
Resolution of A.B.A. House of Delegates (Aug. 9, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.
org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recommendation adopted.pdf.
94. For a list of informal coalition members, see supra note 6.
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harm[ing] employees." 95 Both the informal coalition and the ABA reiterated
these kinds of concerns in August 2005 letters to Judge Hinojosa. 96
2. The Government's Response
The first steps toward a possible rapprochement between the government
and the critics of its corporate privilege waiver policies came a few months
after the ABA's August 2005 resolution and just over a year after the
formation of the ABA Task Force. On October 21, 2005, Acting Deputy
Attorney General Robert D. McCallum issued a two-paragraph
memorandum directing United States Attorneys to establish "review
processes for waiver requests that require federal prosecutors to obtain
approval from the United States Attorney or other supervisor before seeking
a waiver of the attorney-client or work product protection." 97  The
McCallum Memorandum received mixed responses. While some members
of the legal profession expressed optimism, 9 8 many viewed its instructions
regarding the creation of written policies as "a fairly superficial gesture."
99
95. Informal Coalition Letter of Mar. 3, 2005, supra note 6, at 2-3. The coalition
reiterated these same points in comments filed with the USSC on Augustl5, 2005. See
Coalition letter to USSC (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
attorneyclient/materials/047/047.pdf.
96. Letter from Robert D. Evans, Director, A.B.A. Governmental Affairs Office, to
USSC (Aug. 15, 2005) at 3 ("Lawyers for companies and other organizations play a key
role in helping these entities and their officials to comply with the law and to act in the
entity's best interests. . . .By authorizing routine government demands for waiver of
attorney-client and work product protections, the amendment discourages personnel
within companies and other organizations from consulting their lawyers. This, in turn,
seriously impedes the lawyers' ability to effectively counsel compliance with the law."),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/materials/049/049.pdf.
97. Memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum to
Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys on Waiver of Corporate
Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter "McCallum
Memorandum"], at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/
crmOO163.htm. See generally DOJ Instructs US. Attorneys to Formulate Written Process
for Privilege Waiver Requests, 74 U.S.L.W. 2260 (Nov. 8, 2005).
98. See, e.g., remarks of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg to the effect that the
Department's new approach should help to achieve four important objectives by ensuring
better access to information for persons concerned with the number and scope of waivers
requested by federal prosecutors; providing opportunities for consultation among U.S.
Attorneys' offices and defense counsel; facilitating comparison of district policies and
using this information as a basis to seek changes where appropriate; and to build a
foundation for seeking Congressional intervention "if the mainstream appears to intrude
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The USSC, however, clearly took privilege waiver policy concerns very
seriously. In November 2005, the Commission held a public hearing on the
issue. 1°°  At the hearing, the Commission heard testimony from five
representatives of the informal coalition. Former senior Justice Department
officials also testified "about what they perceived as the unintended but
potentially deleterious effects on the criminal justice process of this
commentary language."'O' This testimony recounted a host of problems
created by the pressure to waive the attorney-client and work-product
privileges arising in part from the government's focus on waiver as an
ingredient of "cooperation" pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. The
accompanying recommendations requested amendment of the commentary
to Section 82C.5 to clarify that only disclosure of non-privileged materials
and information is required to establish thorough cooperation pursuant to the
Guidelines.
10 2
Donald Klawiter, Chair of the ABA Antitrust Law Section, testified on
behalf of the ABA that the organization's most significant concerns about
the November 2004 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines centered on
the change in the Commentary to Section 8C2.5 because it "authorizes and
encourages the government to require entities to waive their attorney-client
and work product protections in order to show "thorough" cooperation with
the government and thereby qualify for a reduction in the culpability score..
. .,, 3 He also stressed that the privilege waiver amendment and associated
policies have undermined trust in both in-house and outside counsel, thereby
impeding effective counseling with respect to legal compliance,
too much on the historic reach of the privilege." DOJ Instructs, supra note 97, at 2261
(quoting Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg).
99. DOJ Instructs, supra note 97, at 2261 (quoting Remarks of Jonathan P. Bach on
behalf of the New York Council of Defense Lawyers). See also, e.g., Greco letter, supra
note 2, at 1; Jeremy D. Frey, Privilege Still on Losing End in Corporate- Waiver Dispute:
New US. Memo on Review Process Doesn't Go Far Enough, CLXXII N.J. L. J. at 731
(Nov. 21, 2005).
100. See Notice of Proposed Amendments; Request for Public Comment; Notice of
Public Hearings, 71 Fed. Reg. 4782-4804, available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDR-EG/
Fedreg0l06.pdf (January 2006) [hereinafter "USSC Jan. 2006 Notice"]; see also Notice
of Final Priorities, 70 Fed. Reg. 51398-51399 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/fedr0805, and Notice of Proposed Priorities for the
Amendment Cycle Ending May 1, 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 37145-37146 (June 28, 2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/FEDREG/fedr0605.
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., Klawiter Testimony, supra note 5, at 8; Testimony of Henry W. Asbill
on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers before the United
States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter "Asbill Testimony"], at 4,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/1 1 15 05/Asbill.pdf.
103. Klawiter Testimony, supra note 5, at 3.
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undermining companies' internal compliance programs, and harming
employees.' °4  National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL") representative Henry Asbill focused on the dilemma of
employees facing potential "criminal[] sanction[s] for refusing to talk to [a
company's] internal investigators when it is clear, in the current climate, that
the fruits of such conversations will be turned over to the government, and
yet they cannot assert their Fifth Amendment rights without risking
termination or financial ruination."10 5 He emphasized that the government's
privilege policies have had a chilling effect on communications between
corporate personnel and in-house counsel with respect to legal compliance
issues' °6 and that "erosion of the privilege has diminished the flow and
candor" of information from corporate employees to outside counsel
conducting internal investigations.'
0
Tina Van Dam, Senior Counsel for the National Association of
Manufacturers, also representing the Corporate Counsel Association and the
American Chemistry Counsel, testified that "the commentary has greatly
complicated in-house counsel's already difficult job of counseling our
clients as to ethics, compliance, governance and litigation in a highly
complex and increasingly regulated multi-jurisdictional environment." 1
Stanford Anderson, Senior Counsel for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
emphasized the business community's desire to support prosecution of
"[b]ad actors [that] tarnish the entire business community in the eyes of the
public, and often inflict as much.., harm on other companies as they do on
consumers or investors." 10 9 He stressed, however, that essentially "non-
voluntary" privilege waivers are "making officers and employees reluctant
to involve lawyers in ongoing business activities," thereby "increase[ing] the
104. Id. at7.
105. Asbill Testimony, supra note 102, at 5. See also Duggin, supra note 3, at 907-
12; Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed
More Protection Than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REv. 1, 2-4 & n.6 (1990).
106. Asbill Testimony, supra note 102, at 6.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Testimony of Tina Van Dam, Senior Counsel, National Ass'n of Manufacturers,
on behalf of the American Chemistry Council, the Corporate Counsel Ass'n and the
National Ass'n of Manufacturers, before the United States Sentencing Commission I
(Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Van Dam Testimony], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/1 1_15 05VanDam-ACC-NAM.pdf.
109. Testimony of Stanford D. Anderson, Senior Counsel, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce before the United States
Sentencing Commission I (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Anderson Testimony] available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ll _15 05_/Anderson.pdf.
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risk that those officers and employees will inadvertently violate the law...
[and] hobble internal corporate investigations .. 110
A few months later, in a January 27, 2006 notice requesting input on a
broad variety of subjects, the USSC asked for comments on the privilege
waiver language in the commentary to section 8C2.5 of the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines."' Specifically, as a follow-up to its November 2005
public meeting, the USSC invited input on four questions:
(1) whether this commentary language is having unintended
consequences; (2) if so, how specifically has it adversely affected
the application of the sentencing guidelines and the administration
of justice; (3) whether this commentary language should be
deleted or amended; and (4) if it should be amended, in what
112
manner.
A few days after the USSC issued its notice, ABA President Michael
Greco took the extraordinary step of writing directly to bar leaders "to enlist
[their] help and support in preserving the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine and protecting them from federal governmental policies and
practices that now seriously threaten to erode these fundamental rights."
'"13
Mr. Greco expressed concern that the McCallum Memorandum would do
little to help the situation, suggesting that it "will likely result in numerous
different waiver policies throughout the country, many of which may impose
only token restraints on the ability of federal prosecutors to demand
waiver.",114 His letter asked ABA members to establish committees, contact
local United States Attorneys and Justice Department officials, and comment
on the pending amendments to the USSC's proposed changes in the
organizational guidelines. 115
The ABA and other interest groups have also actively engaged in alerting
federal legislators to the privilege controversy. 116 In response, several
members of Congress have weighed in on the issue. Representative Daniel
Lungren wrote to the USSC Chairman in August 2005 to express concern
that the commentary provision inhibits the ability of lawyers to help
corporate clients comply with the law, suggesting that
110. Id. at 2. Mr. Anderson also noted that the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege applies to remove the protection afforded by the privilege in instances in
which an attorney becomes involved in corporate misconduct. See id. at 4; see generally
RICE, supra note 9 at § 8; VILLA, supra note 9 at § 2:16.
111. See USSC Jan. 2006 Notice, supra note 100.
112. Id.
113. Greco Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2.
116. See, e.g., Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir., A.B.A. Gov't Affairs Office, to the
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch and the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy (Oct. 7, 2004), available at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/0 19/019.pdf.
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to fulfill this role, lawyers must have the trust and confidence of
the entity's leaders and must be provided with all relevant
information necessary to represent the entity effectively, ensure
compliance with the law, and quickly remedy any violations. By
authorizing the government to demand waiver of attorney-client
and work product protections on a routine basis, the amendment
discourages entities from consulting their lawyers. This, in turn,
impedes the lawyers' ability to effectively counsel compliance
with the law and discourages them from conducting internal
investigations designed to quickly detect and remedy misconduct.
As a result, companies and the investing public will be harmed. 17
On March 7, 2006, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security held hearings on the attorney-
client privilege waiver issue. Once again, the ABA, the Coalition, and
former DOJ officials testified or submitted testimony echoing themes similar
to those previously presented to the USSC. The Coalition also cited the
results of recent surveys offering evidence of belief in the potentially
chilling effect of law enforcement waiver policies," 8  emphasizing that
117. Letter from Rep. Daniel Lungren to the Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa (Aug. 15,
2005) at 2 (emphasis in original), available at www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/
materials/048/048.pdf. Other legislators have also offered views on the controversy in
recent months. For example, Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated: "I don't believe there ought to be any coerced waiver of the attorney-
client privilege... I wouldn't wave my attorney-client privilege if I were you - under any
circumstance. [The] Government has the burden of proof.., that's the way it is and the
way it should be." Sen. Arlin Specter, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce/ABA/ACLUINACDL Conference on "Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: What Does the Future Hold," (Nov. 16, 2005) 1-2, available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/acprivtranscriptofsenspecter 11-16-05.pdf. Representative
James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, has observed:
Prosecutors must be zealous and vigorous in their efforts to bring corporate
actors to justice. However, zeal does not equate with "coercion" beyond that
which naturally occurs in a criminal prosecution by fair enforcement of our
laws. To me, mandating privilege waivers as a specific condition of
cooperation in every circumstance crosses the line of fairness.
Rep. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce/ABA/ACLU/NACDL Conference on "Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: What Does the Future Hold," (Nov. 16, 2005) 4-5, available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/acprivsensenbrenner 11-16-05.pdf
118. See Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Survey, supra note 2; Letter from Robert
D. Evans, Director, A.B.A. Governmental Affairs Office, to the Hon. Howard Coble
(Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/polady/lettermarch32006.pdf
[hereinafter Evans-Coble Letter]; Submission to the U.S. House of Representatives
Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security Submitted by the
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federal prosecutors and agency enforcement personnel were continuing to
demand corporate privilege waivers on a routine basis: "'a culture of
waiver' has evolved in which governmental agencies believe it is reasonable
and appropriate for them to expect a company under investigation to broadly
waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections."" 9 The ABA
and the Coalition asked Congress to "send a clear message to the federal
prosecutors at the Department of Justice and other regulatory agencies that
companies and their employees should not be punished for preserving their
rights to exercise their attorney-client privileges."'
2 0
3. The USSC's Decision to Delete the Waiver Reference from the
Commentary to the Organizational Guidelines
Opponents of government policies undermining the corporate attorney-
client privilege won a significant victory in April 2006 when the USSC
voted to delete the reference to waiver of attorney-client and work product
protections from the commentary to section 8C2.5 of the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines because of widespread concern "that the sentence at
issue could be interpreted to encourage waivers." ' 121 The USSC's decision to
abandon the waiver language added to the guidelines commentary in
November 2004 is an important step in restoring the vitality of corporate
attorney-client and work product protections. As Susan Hackett, General
Counsel of the Association of Corporate Counsel, observed, the USSC's
action does not undo the waiver policies of DOJ or other federal agencies,
Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=568 [hereinafter Coalition
Testimony]; Testimony of Dick Thornburgh, Former Attorney General of the United
States before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security Regarding "White
Collar Enforcement (Part 1): Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers (Mar. 7,
2006), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/thornburg030706.pdf; Oral
Testimony on Attorney-Client Privilege by Thomas J. Donohue, President and CEO, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Homeland Security (Mar. 7, 2006), available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/
testimony/2006/060307attorneyclientprivilege.htm.
119. Coalition Testimony, supra note 118, at 7). See also Evans-Coble Letter, supra,
note 119, at 3-4.
120. Coalition Testimony, supra note 118, at 8; Evans-Coble Letter, supra, note 118,
at 3 ("[the A.B.A.] urge[s the Subcommittee] to address and remedy the problems created
by the privilege waiver amendment as soon as possible," to prohibit privilege or work
product waiver demands during investigations, specify the types of factual information
prosecutors may request, and clarify that voluntary waiver decisions will not be part of
the cooperation calculus.).
121. USSC Proposed November 2006 Sentencing Guidelines Amendments, supra
note 1, at 59-60. See also supra note 5.
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but it does "take[] away from prosecutors the ability to gain more leverage
by saying the waiver is recognized by the sentencing guidelines." 122 The
USSC's willingness to eliminate the waiver language demonstrates that
opponents of waiver policies have made a persuasive case for a return to the
Upjohn approach and that the intense public pressure they have brought to
bear on federal decision makers has begun to produce results. The most
important player, however, is DOJ. As evidenced by a Coalition survey,
with or without specific language in the guidelines commentary, prosecutors
acting pursuant to DOJ policies exert compelling influence on corporate
decision makers. 1
23
4. Ongoing Efforts to Eliminate DOJ and Other Federal Privilege
Waiver Policies
Shortly after the USSC's April 2006 decision, ABA President Michael
Greco again wrote to bar leaders urging continued engagement in efforts "to
preserve the attorney-client and work product protections that are so vital to
our legal system."' 12 4 On the same day, Mr. Greco also wrote to Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales requesting Mr. Gonzales "to consider modifying
the Justice Department's internal waiver policy to stop the increasingly
common practice of federal prosecutors requiring organizations to waive
their attorney-client and work product protections as a condition for
receiving cooperation credit during investigations."' 125 The letter enclosed
specific suggestions for revision of the McCallum and Thompson
Memoranda to
(1) prevent[] prosecutors from seeking privilege waiver during
investigations, (2) specify[] the types of factual, non-privileged
information that prosecutors may request from companies as a sign
of cooperation, and (3) clarify[] that any voluntary waiver of
privilege shall not be considered when assessing whether the entity
provided effective cooperation. 1
26
122. Carter, supra note 7.
123. See Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Survey, supra note 2, at 9.
124. Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, A.B.A., to Members (May 2, 2006) at
3 [hereinafter Greco May 2006 Letter]. Specifically, Mr. Greco called on bar leaders to
establish committees, contact DOJ and local U.S. Attorneys, and send op-ed pieces to
local media. Id.
125. Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, A.B.A., to Hon. Alberto Gonzales (May
2, 2006) at 1.
126. ld. at 3.
Spring 2006] Impact of the War Over the 327
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
In sum, the battle lines are drawn, and the opposition is making headway.
Whether the corporate attorney client and work product protections will
emerge from the conflict alive and well, however, still remains to be seen.
11. THE FALLOUT OF THE PRIVILEGE BATTLE ON THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY
The ultimate outcome of the current conflict over attorney-client and work
product protections will have a major impact on health care entities and the
hundreds of thousands of physicians and other individuals engaged in the
provision of health care in the United States. As those who work in this
milieu are only too aware, the American health care system operates within a
staggeringly complex matrix of legal, socioeconomic, and political factors.
This framework is the result of a confluence of factors including: (1) market
forces underlying the shift from fee-for-service medicine to managed care
and the consolidation of entities into health systems, physicians and other
professionals into group practices, and third-party payers into integrated
organizations on a regional and national scale; (2) political and fiscal
constraints on the nature and shape of government benefit programs and
private health insurance; 12 (3) government and private sector efforts to curb
soaring health care costs through anti-fraud-and-abuse efforts;129 and (4)
rapidly advancing technologies accompanied by rising public expectations
pertaining to health care and its delivery. 13 As Mark Hall has pointed out,
"Scholars have long noted that the field of health law lacks cohesion. They
speak in terms of the 'pathologies' of health law, or its contradictory and
127. See, e.g., Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, Managing Care in the New Era
of "Systems-Think": The Implications for Managed Care Organizational Liability and
Patient Safety, 29 J. L. MED. ETHICS 290 (2001); David M. Cutler, Mark McClellan &
Joseph P. Newhouse, How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J. OF ECON. 526-48
(2000); Charles B. Keating, A Systems-based Methodology for Structural Analysis of
Health Care Operations, 14 J. OF MGMT. IN MED. 179 (2000); Lawrence C. Baker &
Martin L. Brown, Managed Care, Consolidations Among Health Care Providers, and
Health Care: Evidence from Mammography, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 351-374 (1999). See
generally, LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, JUDITH AREEN, PATRICIA A. KING, STEVEN GOLDBERG
AND PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 622-41 (3d ed. 2005)
128. See generally id. at 701-10.
129. LINDA A. BAUMANN, ED., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: PRACTICAL
PERSPECTIVES (A.B.A. Health Law Section/Bureau of National Affairs 2002) at 2
(describing increasing complexity of health care fraud and abuse laws).
130. See generally, M. Greg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace,
55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 954 (2002) ("The psychology of denial ensures an unavoidable
minimum of anger and bitterness when health care payers and providers fall short of
unfounded expectations"); GOSTIN, ET AL., supra note 128, at 641-46 and sources
excerpted therein.
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competing 'paradigms,' which constitute a 'chaotic, dysfunctional
patchwork."" The following discussion focuses on the impact of the
privilege battle on the business of health care, as well as the implications of
a weak attorney-client privilege on the quality and integrity of the health
care system.
A. The Need for Legal Advice Amid the Tangled Web of Federal and State
Health Care Laws
Many senior citizens have had difficulty understanding their options and
obligations under Medicare's new Part D. As one state official reported,
"We've had calls from people in tears who could not get their
medications."' 132 Another stated, "People are very angry and very upset.
They are yelling at us .... They feel they cannot trust anything we say about
this program."'1 33  Unfortunately, these comments are emblematic of the
frustrations that many people -- medical professionals, business managers,
patients, and members of the public - often feel in dealing with the
American health care system because of its Gordian nature. The intricacy of
the legal framework in which health care providers work virtually
guarantees that neither individual health care professionals nor the managers
of health care organizations will have the time or expertise to discover, let
alone comprehend, all of the relevant laws, regulations and policies
governing their work. This is a task necessarily delegated, at least in part, to
legal counsel. The work of attorneys in the health law field has always been
important, but now, perhaps more than ever before, counsel must deal with
issues that affect the fiscal health, reputation, and very survival of health
care entities. These issues in turn directly impact the lives of patients,
medical professionals and line employees who depend in one way or another
on these organizations. 134 In the current privilege environment, the task of
health care attorneys is more difficult than at any time in the past.
135
131. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 464 (2002).
132. Robert Pear, States Intervene After Drug Plan Hits Early Snags, THE N.Y. TIMES
at 11 (Jan. 8, 2006) (quoting Sandy K. Hata, field manager, Oregon Dep't of Human
Serv.).
133. Id. (quoting Jane-Ellen A. Weidanz, Medicare project manager, Oregon Dep't of
Human Serv.)
134. The same is sometimes true for attorneys in the field. See generally, Stuart M.
Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in Federal
Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 164 (1999) (noting that erosion of attorney-client
privilege with respect to legal advice in the health care settings "is affecting the quality of
the attorney-client relationship as it is also placing attorneys at personal risk"). Even
before the government began aggressively seeking waivers of the attorney-client and
work product privileges, the complexity of health care laws and payment arrangements
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1. The Dizzying Array of Health Care Laws
Health care entities and medical professionals operate in a world of
overlappin and sometimes inconsistent laws, regulations and contractual
obligations with the constant threat of medical malpractice litigation
looming large. 137 State law governs medical malpractice actions, as well as
the licensing of medical professionals and health care entities, the regulation
of professional practice, and the operation of health care facilities.' 38 State
medical boards, along with other professional bodies, administer licensing
combined with the need for cost-containment efforts caused "many health care providers
to find themselves to be subjects and targets of fraud investigations, prosecutions and qui
tam actions. The health care attorney is caught in the middle of this complexity and must
come to realize that the traditional expectations of near absolute confidentiality of
attorney advice and communications no longer are assured." Id. at 204
135. Even lawyers who have devoted many years to health law "sometimes have
difficulty providing clients with definitive guidance because the laws and regulations are
often ambiguous." BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 2. Health care attorneys also work in an
area of legal and ethical landmines. See Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 134, at 164-66;
Philip L. Pomerance, Ethical Challenges in Everyday Practice for Healthcare Lawyers,
34 A.H.L.A. J. OF HEALTH L. 1 (2001).
136. See Hall, supra note 131, at 464; Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 134, at 204
(discussing complexity of law and regulation and "multiple payer-payee relationships that
often lead to confusing and contradictory interpretation of laws and regulations") and
sources cited supra note 128. Myriad other variations exist ranging from scope-of-
practice regulations applicable to advanced nursing practitioners to reporting
requirements and privacy protections applicable to medical professionals and entities
providing care to persons who have advanced immunodeficiency syndrome and other
contagious conditions.
137. Concern over medical malpractice liability is a matter of national concern. The
Bush Administration has called for reform "to make the medical liability system more
fair, predictable, and timely," on grounds that "[s]kyrocketing medical liability insurance
rates force physicians to restrict their services or close their practices, [and] often [to] feel
compelled to practice "defensive medicine" - ordering unneeded tests and procedures
solely to guard against potential malpractice claims." Reforming Health Care for the 21 st
Century at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/healthcare/index.html
#sectionl0 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). Many physician groups and policy makers agree
with the President's call for reform, see, e.g., Dan Shapiro, A Doctor's Response on
Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES at 21 (Oct. 12, 2003); Jane Gordon, Doctors Plan Rally Over
Malpractice Bills, N.Y. TIMES 5 (Feb. 16, 2003); Dan Shapiro, Essya: Beyond the Blame:
A No-Fault Approach to Malpractice, N.Y. TIMEs at F6 (Sept. 23, 2003). Others,
however, contend that it is medical practice rather than the professional liability system
that requires reform.
138. See generally, BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON,
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW § 1-7, at 13, § 3-1, at 58
(2d ed. 2000); Jason M. Healy, William M. Altman & Thomas C. Fox, Confidentiality of
Health Care Provider Quality of Care Information, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 595, 602 (2002).
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requirements and exercise both rule-making and adjudicative functions with
respect to qualifications, unauthorized practice, scope of practice, and
disciplinary proceedings.1 39  State agencies also administer the laws
governing the establishment and operation of health care entities and their
facilities, enforce reporting provisions and consumer surveys, 140 and
implement public health programs.14 1 The relevant legal and regulatory
frameworks have many similarities, but they also vary in important respects
from state to state.
1 42
As the nation's largest health care consumer-principally through
Medicare 143 and Medicaid144-and its largest employer, 145 the federal
government is the single most important player on the national health care
scene. Federal programs, particularly Medicare and Medicaid, are
administered through a complex system of rules and regulations that
sometimes bewilder even the experts, particularly when it comes to fraud
and abuse. 46 Federal law also operates with respect to patient privacy,
147
139. See FURROW, ET AL., supra note 138, at 13-37.
140. See id at 62-80; Healy, Altman & Fox, supra note 138, at 603-04.
141. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law: A Renaissance, 30 J. L. MED. &
ETics 136 (2002). Much of our current framework of state public health law is based on
antiquated medical concepts, multiple layers of statutes that are often inconsistent and
mandates that frequently lack safeguards for individual rights. Id. at 137.
142. Some states, for example, permit hospitals, health maintenance organizations and
other entities to employ physicians, but a minority still prohibit entities from employing
physicians on the basis of the venerable common law doctrine against the "corporate
practice of medicine" still extant under the common law or statutory provisions of a
number ofjurisdictions. See infra note 209
143. Medicare provides health care benefits funded principally by payroll taxes to
individuals sixty-five years of age and older and to people of all ages with certain types
of disabilities and/or end-stage renal disease requiring dialysis or a kidney transplant. See
CMS Medicare Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareGenlnfo/.
144. Medicaid, jointly funded by the federal government and the states, offers health
care coverage to individuals with low incomes and very limited financial resources on the
basis of specific eligibility criteria set by each state within broad parameters established
by federal law. See CMS Medicare Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGen
Info. The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) is a related program
targeted at needy children. "SCHIP is jointly financed by the Federal and State
governments and is administered by the States." CMS SCHIP Overview,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/LowCostHealthlnsFamChild/.
145. As of November 2005, the federal government's civilian workforce consisted of
2,700,583 employees. Office of Personnel Management, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/
html/2005/november/table1 .asp.
146. See BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 2 (describing increasing complexity of health
care fraud and abuse laws).
Spring 2006] Impact of the War Over the 331
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
access to health care facilities, 48 the dispensing of drugs and other
controlled substances, 14




5 ' and in many other areas.
52
In addition to the astounding array of state and federal laws and
regulations, health care providers must abide by contractual obligations,
payment policies and procedures of third-party payers in the private sector.
Accrediting agencies, particularly the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), also enter into the mix
147. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-82, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg41 and 45 C.F.R. Pts. 160,
164).
148. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000)
(addressing obligation of hospitals that operate emergency rooms and participate in
Medicare program to provide screening and stabilizing functions regardless of a patient's
ability to pay).
149. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801A (2000). See also Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397.
150. See Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 650-678 (2000). Noting the number of hazards in
any hospital, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration provides a special
"etool" for hospitals and health care workers in hospital settings at
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/hospital/mainpage.html.
151. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq (2000).
152. Individuals and organizations involved in health care also face innumerable other
kinds of legal dilemmas on a daily basis, ranging from questions about the rules
promulgated by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) in keeping with its
responsibilities under the National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274g (2000),
to legal and ethical issues attendant to experimental gene manipulation therapies. The
UNOS issue made the front pages of newspapers across the nation when the United
States Government alleged that physicians at the University of Chicago Hospitals
physicians had misrepresented the health status of patients as a means of placing them
higher on organ donation waiting lists. See Steve Warmbir, UIC Hospital Sued For
Medicare Fraud; Facility Accused Of Rigging List Of Patients Awaiting New Livers,CHI.
SUN TIMES, July 29, 2003, at 3; Thomas M. Burton & Amy Merrick, US. Alleges Liver-
Transplant Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at A3. The legal and ethical issues
embedded in experimental gene manipulation therapies also have received significant
media coverage. See Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research Patient
Safeguards, Oversight Key Issues, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at Al; Patient, 18,
Dies at Penn During Gene-Therapy Test. He Was Undergoing Treatment for a Rare
Disorder. Some Had Said Research Moved Too Quickly, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 29,
1999, at AI. On a more prosaic but equally important level, legal questions may arise in
connection with uncertainties about Occupational Safety and Health Administration
safety requirements for health care workers, see supra note 150; hazardous waste
disposal regulations, see RCRA, supra note 151; or any of an incalculable number of
other types of issues pertaining to every aspect of health care services.
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in the important role of setting quality standards and monitoring the
operation of thousands of member organizations from a quality-of-care
perspective. 153  JCAHO accreditation is essential from a public relations
standpoint, but it also serves as a means of demonstrating compliance with
certain Medicare and Medicaid program requirements,15 4 as well as those of
private insurers and other third-party payers. 155 While JCAHO performs a
much needed function, its standards, reporting mandates, and other
requirements add yet another layer of complexity to federal, state and local
law.
2. Anti-Fraud Laws and Other Provisions Pertaining to the
Integrity of Charges for Health Care
A number of federal agencies and their state counterparts are actively
involved in the ongoing effort to ensure that those who provide health
care-physicians, therapists, hospitals, health maintenance organizations,
and other medical professionals and entities-do so honestly and in
accordance with standards prescribed pursuant to government benefit156
programs. The aggressive enforcement of anti-fraud laws in the health
care sector began in the early 1990's when Clinton Administration officials
declared an all-out campaign against health care fraud. 157 During this time
The Commission is governed by a board comprised of medical professionals and
consumers, and it engages medical professionals to perform its survey functions. See
Facts about the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
http://www.jcaho.org/AboutUs/joint commission facts.htm. For discussion of the
functions of JCAHO, its role in American health care, and critiques of the Commission,
see FURROW, ET AL., supra note 138, § 1-4 at 8-10.
154. Medicare accepts JCAHO accreditation as evidence of satisfaction of most
program requirements pursuant to a "deemed" status provision. See 42 U.S.C. §§
1395x(e) & 1395bb. See generally, FURROW, ET AL., supra note 138, at 8; Healy, Altman
& Fox, supra note 138, at 603-04.
155. FURROW, ET AL., supra note 138, at 8.
156. In the words of Linda Baumann, for both the government and the private sector,
"[h]ealth care fraud and abuse has become a growth industry." BAUMANN, supra note
129, at 2. See generally David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market
Change, Social Norms, and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen, " 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531
at 531-32 (2001) ("there has been a steady upward trend over the past 6 years in civil,
criminal, and administrative fraud enforcement").
157. See, e.g., Press Release, HHS Press Office, President Announces Health Care
Anti-Fraud Project: Operation Restore Trust (May 3, 1995), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1995pres/950503; Press Release, DHHS Press Office,
Shalala Announces a Toll-Free Hot Line to Fight Medicare and Medicaid Fraud (June
27, 1995), available at http://www.os.dhhs.gov/news/press/1995pres/950627b.html. See
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period, DOJ and other federal agencies initiated a number of anti-fraud
programs,' 58 and Attorney General Janet Reno listed health care fraud as her
department's "number two initiative behind violent crime."' 5 9 The Bush
Administration has similarly embraced a commitment to find and punish
"those in the health care community who commit fraud against the taxpayers
of this country."' 60 In fiscal year 2004, federal authorities obtained more
generally, Fact Sheet, CMS Office of Public Affairs, The Clinton Administration's
Comprehensive Strategy to Fight Healthcare Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, Mar. 16, 1998,
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter-336. As one
article notes, "It was the failure of the comprehensive Clinton Administration plan to
reform health insurance that led to the politically bipartisan recognition that, if there
could be no consensus on fundamental structural reform, the public demand for cost
control beat (i.e., at the least political risk) could be satisfied by waging a visible
prosecutorial war against health care fraud." Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 134, at 166.
See also Michael E. Clark, Whether the False Claims Act Is a Proper Legal Tool for the
Government to Use for Improving the Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 15
No. I HEALTH LAW. 12, 12 (2002) ("In the mid-1990's our elected officials dodged their
accountability for not having properly addressed the problem of escalating health care
costs by reverting to a strategy that they used to deflect criticism during the Savings and
Loan Crisis: Congress and the White House blamed members of the responsible industry
(this time, doctors and other professionals) for being too greedy and corrupt").
158. Some of these programs have catchy names such as "Who Pays? You Pay." See
Kathleen A. Peterson, First Nursing Homes, Next Managed Care: Limiting Liability in
Quality of Care Cases Under the False Claims Act, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 69, 70 (2000).
For discussion of a number of Clinton Administration anti-health-care-fraud initiatives,
see Russell Hayman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: How to Navigate the Compliance
Process, Dissecting a Health Care Fraud Investigation, 1129 PLI/Corp 223, 238-44
(1999).
159. JANET RENO, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annual reports/ar94/finalag.txt. In 1997,
Clinton Administration Attorney General Janet Reno stated: "Fighting health care fraud
is one of this Administration's highest priorities. Health care fraud and abuse costs
Americans millions of dollars every year, degrades the quality of our system, and hinders
ordinary Americans from getting the care they need." Press Release, United States DOJ
(Mar. 6, 1997) at 1, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/l997/March97/095ag.htm.
160. "Skeptics who predicted the new Bush Administration would prove more
sympathetic to the health care industry than its predecessor have seen their hopes dashed
in the face of consistent fraud recoveries of close to a billion dollars a year." Joan H.
Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y. Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 241, 241 (2004). See, e.g., Comey, supra note 51, at 3. Mr. Comey noted that
the Bush Administration's "commitment to root out and punish corporate wrongdoers"
applies to wrongdoers in the health care community "with equal force," id at 1, and that
"the Attorney General considers health care fraud, like corporate fraud, to be a top
priority in the Department's efforts to tackle white collar crime." Id. at 3. Mr. Comey
also noted that then-Associate Attorney General, later Acting Deputy Attorney General,
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than 605 million dollars in health care judgments and settlements; received
1.7 billion dollars in various payments of fines, penalties and restitution;
initiated 1002 new criminal investigations pertaining to suspected health
care fraud and 868 civil fraud investigations; filed criminal charges in 395
cases against 646 defendants; obtained convictions against 459 defendants in
criminal proceedings; and won or settled 269 civil cases.'61
Law enforcement authorities utilize a variety of tools in combating health
care fraud. 162 These devices range from general mechanisms including the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 63 the false statements provision, 64 the
False Claims Act,' 65  and Sarbanes-Oxley, 166  to statutory vehicles
specifically targeted at the health care industry such as the Ethics in Patient
Referrals Act (more commonly known as the "Stark" Law), 167 the Anti-
Robert McCallum had asked all United States Attorneys to make tackling health care
fraud atop priority. Id.
161. See The Dep't of Health and Human Svcs. and the Dep't of Justice, Health Care
Fraud and Abuse Control Program, Annual Report for FY 2004, available at
www.doj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2004.htm [hereinafter DHHS/DOJ 2004 Report];
Joan H. Krause, "Promises to Keep ": Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims
Act, 23 CARDOzo L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2002).
162. For discussion of general and targeted enforcement mechanisms utilized by
federal and sate law enforcement authorities, see, e.g., Jonathan Cone, Marisa Levinson
& Shelley Finlayson, Health Care Fraud, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 713 (2003); Joan H.
Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing, supra note 160 at 1-21; BAUMANN, supra
note 129; Hayman, supra note 158, at 228-37.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See also 18 U.S. C. § 1035 (pertaining to "false statements
relating to health care matters").
165. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 2003). See generally Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E.
Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues
in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 105-06; Krause, Promises to Keep,
supra note 161, at 1367; Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc:
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 128, 128-
29 (2001); Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False
Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 105, 106 (1999).
166. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). See
generally Department of Justice, Field Guidance on New Criminal Authorities Enacted in
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (H.R. 3763) Concerning Corporate Fraud and
Accountability, Aug. 1, 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/saroxl.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2006).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395nn (2000), is known as the "Stark Law" in honor of its original sponsor Fortney
"Pete" Stark. In its current form, the Stark law "prohibit[s] the referral of Medicare and
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Kickback Statute,' 68 and the enforcement provisions of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. 69 Most states have analogous
statutes. 170 Some of these federal and state statutes, most notably the Civil
False Claims Act,171 permit private parties to bring suit on behalf of
themselves and the federal or a state government.172 In addition to criminal
Medicaid patients to health care providers with which the referring physician has a
financial relationship." See Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing, supra
note 160, at 243-44 & n. 10 (2004).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(2) (2000). As one recent note points out, "[t]o complicate
matters, the Stark statute and the Anti-Kickback provisions are not entirely consistent
with one another. As a result, arrangements that comply with one may still violate the
other." Jeremy Fine Bollinger, Note, Doctoring Fraud and Abuse: Enforcement of Stark
and the Anti-Kickback Law in Physician Recruitment May Be Bad for Your Health, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 485, 493-95 (2004) (footnote omitted) (citing Linda A. Baumann,
Navigating the New Safe Harbors to the Anti-Kickback Statute, 12 HEALTH LAW. 1, 3
(2000). See also Jonathan L. Diesenhaus & Laura F. Laemmle, Enforcement of Health
Care Kickback Prohibitions Through the Civil False Claims Act: Recent Trends, 53 U. S.
Arr'Ys' BULL. 36-37 (2005).
169. "HIPAA implemented the most sweeping amendments to the federal health care
fraud laws to date[,] ... creat[ing] five new federal health care fraud crimes." BAUMANN,
supra note 129, at 213). See also Peter A. Winn, Criminal Prosecutions Under HIPAA,
53 U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL. 21 (2005).
170. BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 37-39. For a compilation of state false claims
statutes, see the appendix to John R. Munich & Elizabeth W. Lane, When Neglect
Becomes Fraud: Quality of Care and False Claims, 43 ST. Louis U. L. J. 27, 48-52
(1999) (analyzing use of quality-of-care theories in False Claims Act cases).
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000).
172. The Civil False Claims Act permits individuals to file civil actions for violation
of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 in the name of the United States government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)
(2000). If the government proceeds with the action, the qui tam plaintiff, known as the
"relator," receives from fifteen to twenty-five percent of any recovery. 31 U.S.C. §
3720(d)(2) (2000); BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 21. If the government does not go
forward with the action, the relator may still elect to do so with entitlement to between
twenty-five and thirty percent of any recovery. Id. The rewards for successful
prosecution or settlement of false claims actions can be quite lucrative for relators. See
SmithKline Case to Benefit 3 Men, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1998, at D18 ($2 million
awarded to 3 relators in False Claims action against SmithKline for Medicare fraud). See
also BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 21-22; Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False Claim,
27 AM. J. L. & MED. 181, 181-82 (2001); Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic Model to
Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act Cases on Access to Healthcare for the Elderly,
Disabled, Rural, and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 439, 460 (2001); Efrem M.
Grail, Qui Tam Insurance & False Claims Settlements, II HEALTH LAW. 16 (1998). The
False Claims Act, a statute dating back to the post-Civil War era, is among the most
draconian of these measures. See Krause, Promises to Keep, supra note 161, at 1367.
The Civil False Claims Act has become one of the government's most popular tools. Its
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and civil monetary sanctions, the threat of debarment from federal contracts
is another weapon at the disposal of federal authorities.'
73
In recent years, the federal government has embarked on a number of
initiatives aimed at reigning in various types of billing fraud, casting a net
that has caught Caremark, Columbia!HCA, Health South, and other large
corporate health care entities, as well as home health care agencies,
hospices, hospital outpatient services, physicians and hospitals involved in
graduate medical education programs, and testing services at hospitals and
independent laboratories, among others. 74  On several occasions the
Department of Health and Human Services has unveiled enforcement
campaigns specially designed to focus public attention on health care fraud.
Operation Restore Trust, for example, inaugurated anti-fraud efforts in the
Clinton Administration,175 and the Bush Administration has continued these
kinds of campaigns. 176
The operative interplay of these anti-fraud mechanisms with substantive
health laws and with each other is often difficult to comprehend. The ways
in which these laws are enforced, however, makes the task even more
daunting. As Joan Krause has pointed out:
treble damages provision and statutory penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 per claim-
potentially applicable, for example, to each of the many line items on a Medicare
patient's hospital bill-can be catastrophic for health care entities. Id. at 1367, 1413.
Federal authorities frequently use the statute as a sword, and it is increasingly common
for private parties to file qui tam actions pursuant to the Civil False Claims Act. Id. at
1413 (noting that most cases settles but that "settlement has the effect of removing crucial
legal issues from the courtroom.").
173. 48 C.F.R. § 9406-2 (2005). See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2000 & Supp. 2005). For a
compilation of provisions pertaining to the authority of HHS to exclude health care
providers from participation in programs, see BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 607-10. See
id at 32-35. See also DHHS/DOJ 2004 Report, supra note 161, at 1-44.
174. See Hayman, supra note 158, at 238-44; Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of
Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 55 (2003).
175. See generally id; BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 2-8.
176. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Admin. On Aging, HHS Awards $4.5 Million For
Senior Medicare Patrol Projects (July 3, 2002), http://www.aoa.gov/smp/about/about.pr_
070302.asp; Press Release, U.S. Admin. On Aging, HHS Awards $9.3 Million for Senior
Medicare Patrol Projects (May 3, 2001), http://www.aoa.gov/smp/about/aboutpr
050301.asp; Press Release, U.S. Admin. On Aging, HHS Announces Expanded "Senior
Patrol" Grants to Help Spot Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid (June 17,
1999), http://www.aoa.gov/smp/about/about pr_061799.asp; and Press Release, U.S.
Admin. On Aging, Medicare Expands Crackdown On Waste, Fraud And Abuse In
Community Mental Health Centers (September 29, 1998) http://www.aoa.gov/smp/about/
aboutpr_092998.asp.
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Although at times it may seem that the health care fraud laws are
all-encompassing, the meaning of their proscriptions is not self-
evident... There are three general pathways through which such
information has been conveyed to health care providers... HHS
conveys information by regulating health care fraud, . . . HHS
offers informal guidance to health care providers. . . [and] both
government prosecutors and qui tam relators convey information
about fraud through the types of enforcement actions they
pursue. 177
As Professor Krause also notes, the degree to which HHS and other
agencies rely on informal guidance and enforcement mechanisms rather than
more extensive regulation is in part a function of the dynamic nature of the
health care sector, particularly in recent years, because rapid changes make it
almost impossible to engage in the relatively time-consuming formal
regulatory process. 178 Unfortunately, informal guidance is issued in sporadic
fashion, and reliance on informal guidance is never risk-free because it does
not legally bind the government. 179  Post hoc enforcement is even less
desirable as a means of achieving cost and quality integrity, yet "[t]he
phenomenon of 'regulation by litigation' has been recognized as a growing -
and at times problematic - trend in American law."' 180 Thus, the complexity
of the anti-fraud laws is compounded by the manner in which participants in
the health care sector are regulated and the ways in which federal and state
officials enforce the applicable laws. The shifting sands of health care fraud
enforcement stand out in a legal system that generally "has developed into a
complex and intricate maze not always easy to navigate. . . [with]
complexities [that] make it unlikely that clients are able to conduct their
legal affairs without fully informed representation by an attorney." 
8 1
The need for lawyers to be intimately involved in the health care sector is
unlikely to diminish anytime soon. As James Sheehan, Chief of the Civil
Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, recently observed, "Complexity in regulation feeds on itself.
• .In health care, there is no politically appealing alternative model (even
assuming effectiveness), little political tolerance for risk during any period
177. Krause, Regulating, Guiding and Enforcing, supra note 160, at 247. See also
Krause, Conceptual Model, supra note 174, at 55.
178. Krause, Regulating, Guiding and Enforcing, supra note 160, at 249. As
Professor Krause notes, the current regulatory system "fails to generate a key commodity
for health care providers: clear directions from those who are charged with interpreting
and enforcing the fraud laws." Id. at 280.
179. See id at 261, n.91; WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW § 45 (3d ed. 1997); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 13.38 (2d ed.)
(2005-06 update).
180. Krause, Regulating, Guiding and Enforcing, supra note 160, at 272.
181. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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of change, and little promise of significant benefit; so simplifying reforms- ,,182
are not likely in the foreseeable future. So long as the legal framework
remains intricate, health care entities and medical professionals will continue
to need the advice and assistance of counsel to survive and prosper.
III. THE OVERALL IMPACT OF ONGOING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE HEALTH CARE ARENA
Lawyers can be effective counselors and advocates only when their clients
consult them. Clients, however, are unlikely to seek legal assistance if there
is a significant chance that their communications will not remain
confidential. As the Supreme Court recognized in Upjohn, "corporations,
unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey
the law."'" It is not, however, artificial legal persons who seek legal
advice, but living, breathing human beings who do so on behalf of these
entities. Concern that client and client constituent inquiries and responses
may be disclosed severely handicaps lawyers in their ability to guide clients
in their efforts to comply with applicable laws. 184  In health care, this
disability is likely to create several types of negative effects. The following
discussion highlights four of the most serious: restriction of services that are
vulnerable to legal uncertainties, limitation of internal quality reviews,
adverse impacts on employees and disruption of provider-professional
relationships, and discouragement of internal investigation of potential
wrongdoing. Over time, these results are likely to affect the quality of health
care, the professional lives of those who work in the industry, and the ability
of government authorities to enforce health care laws.
182. James G. Sheehan, Book Review Essay, Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
Practical Perspectives, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 135, 136 (2003) (reviewing LINDA A.
BAUMANN, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES (2002)). Mr.
Sheehan notes that many of the legal materials issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services "are available on the Internet, and/or computerized legal search engines,
but are not easily found unless you know exactly what you are looking for and where to
look." Id at 139
183. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 383, 392 (1981). See supra text
accompanying notes 14-33. See A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 9
(discussing the importance of "foster[ing] an open dialog between a corporation's
management and corporate counsel").
184. See, e.g., Robeck, et al., supra note 57.
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A. Chilling Effects on Services
One of the tragic, albeit unintended, consequences of the complexity of
the American health care system is that a lack of understanding of the law
can adversely impact the quality of the health care provided by medical
professionals and health care entities. As Kristen Schlegel and Sarah
Shannon have cogently observed with respect to end-of-life care, "a lack of
knowledge of legal guidelines, or perhaps worse yet, a mistaken belief about
what is legal may be the most serious impediment to quality of care at the
end of life."' 85 This is particularly true with respect to medical decisions
that carry, or are perceived to carry, a risk of legal liability. A number of
articles in legal and medical journals have chronicled the adverse impact that
anxiety over the legal consequences of medical decisions can have on health
care services.1i 6 From time to time, these kinds of fears have adversely
affected decisions pertaining to hospice care, "do not resuscitate" orders,
advance directives, palliative care, home care, termination of life support,
and many other subjects that may be colored by both accurate and inaccurate
assumptions about applicable legal principles.' 87  Some of the most
compelling examples of the impact of uncertainty on the provision of health
care services occurred several years ago when physicians across the country
hesitated to prescribe adequate pain medication because they were uncertain
about the risks of professional sanctions or even prosecution in an
environment dominated by an aggressive federal campaign against illegal
drugs and illicit use of prescription medications.
188
In recent years, medical professionals and health care entities frequently
have been on the receiving end of law enforcement initiatives. One of the
first such programs was the Physcians at Teaching Hospitals (PATH)
initiative launched in the early 1990's as part of Operation Restore Trust.
89
As a result of this initiative, several university hospitals paid tens of millions
of dollars to the federal government. 90  A number of other health care
185. Kristen Lee Schlegel & Sarah E. Shannon, Legal Guidelines Related to End-of-
Life Decisions: Are Nurse Practitioners Knowledgeable?, 26 J. GERONTOLOGICAL
NURSING 14, 16 (2000), quoted in Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Lfe
Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUES L & MED. 111, 113 (2003).
186. See, e.g., Kapp, supra note 185, at 114-15. Cf sources cited infra note 193
(discussing comparative costs and benefits of False Claims Act proceedings with respect
to quality of care and access to medical services).
187. See, e.g., Kapp, supra note 185, at 132.
188. See, e.g., Krause, Medical Error, supra note 172, at 196; Ann Alpers, Criminal
Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the Dying, 26 J. L. MED. &
ETHIcs 308 (1998); Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of
the Pain ReliefAct, 24 J. L. MED. & ETIcs 319, 320 (1996).
189. See BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 21-26.
190. See generally Leon Assprung, Federal Civil Health Care Litigation and
Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1 22-28 (1998).
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXII:301
providers in the private sector have faced even greater fines and penalties in
connection with criminal and civil enforcement proceedings, particularly
those initiated pursuant to the Civil False Claims Act.19 1 As noted earlier,
law enforcement officials also have utilized the False Claims Act and other
tools to challenge not only billing methods but the quality of care furnished
by some providers.'
92
191. See DHHS/DOJ 2004 Report, supra note 161; Krause, Conceptual Model, supra
note 174; BAUMANN, supra note 129, at 21-26.
192. See, e.g., Michael Stockman, Note, This May Sting a Bit: Policing Skin Care in
Nursing Facilities by Litigating Fraud, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1041, 1044, 1077 (2002)
("By providing for significant potential liability, the False Claims Act provides a
meaningful and aggressive method to prevent pressure ulcers in a large, vulnerable
elderly population."); David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in
Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term Facilities, 6 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 147 (1997)
(arguing that False Claims Act proceedings can improve quality of care). Many
commentators, however, question the use of the False Claims Act to address health care
quality issues, suggesting that this strategy is likely to constrict access to health care for
the poor, the elderly and other vulnerable groups, and that it discourages physicians and
other professionals from participating fully in quality improvement programs See, e.g.,
Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Dying in America - an Examination of Policies
that Deter Adequate End-of-life Care in Nursing Homes, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 294,
304-05 (2005); Clark, supra note 157, at 12 (discussing potential misuse and associated
risks of employing False Claims Act as a tool for achieving quality, especially the need to
avoid focusing on overutilization that may discourage utilization of hospital and other
services); Matthew, supra note 172, at 463 (suggesting that "over-enforcement of the
[False Claims Act] is likely to disproportionately harm access to healthcare for the most
underserved populations"); Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 165, at 106 ("it simply
makes no sense for federal prosecutors, no matter how well intentioned or expert, to
establish clinical care norms [because] . . . an array of expert federal, state and private
authorities are already responsible for monitoring quality of care concerns .. "); Michael
M. Mustokoff, The Government's Use of the Civil False Claims Act to Enforce Standards
of Quality of Care: Ingenuity or the Heavy Hand of the 800-Pound Gorilla, 6 ANNALS OF
HEALTH L. 137 (1997); Hyman, supra note 156.
Joan Krause points out that this enforcement approach "may preempt important medical,
organizational, and regulatory debates that are crucial to the goal of promoting true
quality care," Krause, Medical Error, supra note 172, at 200. Professor Krause also
notes that patients rarely receive direct financial benefits from False Claims Act
recoveries. See Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A Patient-
Centered Approach, 37 J. HEALTH L. 161 (2004). She points out
that quality-related fraud involves two distinct victims: the patients whose care
is affected and the federal program that pays for that care. In that context, it is
unclear whether recovered funds should be used primarily to remedy injuries to
patients or to remedy financial losses suffered by the federal Treasury.
Id. at 162.
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These events should make health care managers and medical professionals
eager to consult counsel about questions pertaining to the care they provide
and the charges they submit for their services. However, if they fear that
their inquiries will end up in the hands of law enforcement personnel, there
is little reason for managers and medical professionals to seek out corporate
counsel, a course of action that may well disproportionately impact the most
vulnerable patients. 93 Instead of consulting hospital counsel, for example, a
staff physician may choose simply to avoid areas that raise any possibility of
legal questions. Similarly, a nursing home's medical director may transfer
an elderly patient near death to an acute care hospital rather than allowing
the patient to spend her last days in a more comfortable, less invasive setting
in obedience to the maxim: "When in doubt, ship them out. Make the
patient the other guy's problem."'' 94 In addition, without appropriate legal
advice, medical professionals and entity employees are far more likely to go
astray in the incredibly complicated maze of laws and regulations applicable
to health care billing.
B. Deterrents to Internal Quality Assurance Efforts
Internal quality review is essential to providing good health care. 195
However, fear that materials generated in the course of quality reviews will
end up in the hands of prosecutors or civil plaintiffs undoubtedly diminishes
enthusiasm for the review process.' 96  While state peer review statutes
generally provide reasonably adequate protection to health care quality
review functions in organizational settings,' 97 the recent rash of privilege
waiver demands by law enforcement authorities, combined with the
reluctance of the courts to recognize selective waiver as a legitimate
doctrine, 19 threatens to alter the existing balance.199 Consequently, in health
care settings in particular, the absence of a vital attorney-client privilege
193. See, e.g., Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 192, at 304-05; Matthew, supra note
172, at 463; Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 165, at 106; Mustokoff, supra note 192, at
144; Healy, Altman, & Fox, supra note 138, at 600.
194. Kapp, supra note 185, at 119-20.
195. Healy, Altman, & Fox, supra note 138, at 596 (noting that "an important
predicate to quality improvement is for providers themselves to identify medical errors
and other quality problems through data analysis and the generation of self-critical
quality of care information. Once deficient care is identified and analyzed, systemic
solutions can be developed to prevent [their] recurrence.").
196. See, e.g., id at 597, 600.
197. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 138, at §§ 4-26 - 4-28.
198. See discussion supra part I.B.4.
199. FURROW ET AL., supra note 138, at § 4-26. State peer review protections do not
generally preclude access by regulatory agencies..
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threatens not only "the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their
client's compliance with the law," 200 but also the ability of counsel to assist
medical providers with assessment and improvement of the quality of the
services they provide. As Jason Healy, William Altman and Thomas Fox
have observed,
[t]he ubiquity of false claims actions and other fraud and abuse
litigation against health care providers has provided a disincentive
for providers to conduct thorough internal reviews of their quality
of care practices because of the legitimate fear that documents
pertaining to these reviews will be used against them in the
courtroom.
20 1
Ironically, uncertainty over attorney-client and work product protections
has peaked at a time when health care professionals, entities and oversight
organizations have implemented significant new approaches to quality-of-
care issues in response to the Institute of Medicine's 2000 report To Err Is
202Human: Building a Safer Health System, and the results of other
investigations reflecting a relatively high incidence of avoidable errors in the• 203 i1
provision of health care services. These studies, along with calls from
medical quality experts to incorporate aspects of aviation safety procedures204
and other successful quality systems, have prompted government officials,
accrediting agencies, and the public to demand greater accountability from
health care providers. Among the principal means of accomplishing this
200. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 383, 392 (1981). See supra text
accompanying notes 9-26.
201. Healy, Altman, & Fox, supra note 138, at 607.
202. COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., To ERR
Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn, et al., eds.) (2001). ("The
twentieth century witnessed a marvelous series of medical and surgical innovations that
have vastly increased our ability to cure or relieve .... But this marvelous technological
accomplishment of American healthcare has brought with it a nearly overwhelming
complexity, fragmentation and, as the Institute of Medicine has starkly demonstrated, the
ability not just to cure, but also to harm."). Martin D. Merry, Healthcare's Need for
Revolutionary Change, 30 QUALITY PROGRESS 31 (Sept. 2003). See generally Healy,
Altman, & Fox, supra note 139, at 596; Michael S. Lawlor, Academic Medicine Under
Economic Stress: A Case Study of the Institutional Change Transforming American
Health Care, 60 REV. OF Soc. EcON. 435 (2002).
203. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle Mello, Patient Safety and Medical
Malpractice: A Case Study, 139 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 267, 267-73 (2003);
PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL
PRACTICE STUDY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1990).
204. See FURROW, ET AL., supra note 138 at 32-63; see COMMISSION ON QUALITY OF
HEALTH CARE, supra note 202, at 5.
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objective is the implementation of reporting mandates such as JCAHO's
Sentinel Events Policy,205 and encouragement of enhanced internal review
procedures.206 To a large extent these measures are designed to deter the
tendency of medical professionals to rely on a "perfectability" model that
focuses on individual error as the cause of adverse outcomes and to
concentrate instead on addressing human and technological shortcomings by
building in safety mechanisms and by implementing systemic changes.
20 7
However, implementing changes, especially the process of identifying and
investigating the underlying causes of medical problems, often requires legal
assistance. When health care providers cannot depend on the confidentiality
of their dealings with counsel, their willingness to involve attorneys in these
matters understandably suffers with concomitant impacts on the ability of
health care services to evolve and change in the most legally responsible
ways. The lack of confidentiality augments the "generalized fear and
loathing of anything connected to the law, lawyers, or the legal process
[that] is innate among all health care providers."
20
C. Adverse Impacts on Individuals and Disruption of Provider-Professional
Relationships
As NACDL representative Henry Asbill testified in November 2005
before the USSC, the government's privilege waiver policies have had a
devastating impact on employees, particularly in the context of internal
investigations. In the course of internal investigative interviews, employees
205. See JCAHO Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures, available at
http://www.jcaho.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures/se-pp.htm
206. As one article explains:
[A]s documented by the IOM and other quality experts, providers who engage
in self-critical analysis are more likely to provide quality patient care. This
hypothesis is based on the assumption that health care providers, whether for-
profit or not-for-profit entities, seek to provide a better "product" (i.e., patient
care) to their customers (i.e., patients). As the provider undertakes greater
efforts to examine ways in which it can improve the delivery of health care
services to patients, the quality of patient care improves, with the added
advantage of achieving greater compliance with governmental regulations.
Healy, Altman & Fox, supra note 138, at 600. In this vein, these authors contend that
"[p]rotecting the confidentiality of self-critical quality of care information from
disclosure to non-governmental third parties would not interfere with this charge." Id. at
601 An analogous argument could be made in favor of application of the selective
waiver doctrine to both quality-of-care and other types of health care data.
207. See, e.g., Lucian Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 J.A.M.A. 1851 (1994); Timothy
S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the
Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 825, 838-39 (1995).
208. Kapp, supra note 185, at 122.
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and others associated with entities20 9 "must make a Hobson's choice about
whether or not to speak with corporate counsel.,, 2 10 They may well lose the
protection of the Fifth Amendment if they decide to do so, yet they may lose
their jobs if they do not.2 11 At a minimum, they may be embarrassed by
certain disclosures, or-and sometimes worse for their career prospects-
humiliate superiors even in instances in which no criminal violation is ever
uncovered. Individuals in such situations "cannot communicate candidly
and effectively with in-house counsel in order to prevent compliance
problems," 2 13 and they "cannot be candid with outside counsel conducting
internal investigations. 21 4
This is precisely the situation in which physicians and other medical
professionals may find themselves. While members of the medical
profession are often familiar with at least some aspects of the law applicable
to health care, physicians and other medical professionals may not be aware
of the risk that responding to inquiries in the course of an internal
investigation may jeopardize their constitutional rights. Medical
professionals who work in health care entities are often accustomed to
cooperating with counsel and other investigators in quality-of-care inquiries
protected by state peer review laws,2 15 as well as in the defense of medical
malpractice actions in which attorney-client and work product privileges are
generally available.
At a time when many successful organizations-certainly those that most
would consider to be humane employers operating good workplaces-put a
premium on employee loyalty, 2 16 the government's privilege waiver policies
are likely to alienate medical professionals and other health care workers
217from the entities with whom they work. In the health care environment
this is particularly dangerous. Effective health care depends on building
209. At one time most states prohibited corporations or other entities from employing
physicians pursuant to the "corporate practice" doctrine. See FURROW ET AL, supra note
138, at § 5-10. The legacy of this doctrine lingers in that most hospital-physician
relationships are still based on a staff model rather than an employment relationship. Id.
In many academic medical centers the faculty participate in a separate practice plan.
Even so, the relationship between provider and professional is often quite similar to an
employer-employee relationship.
210. Asbill Testimony, supra note 102, at 4.
211. Id.; Duggin, supra note 3, at 907-08 (citations omitted).
212. Duggin, supra note 3, at 909.
213. Asbill Testimony, supra note 102, at 6.
214. Id. at 7.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94, 206-08.
216. See Duggin, supra note 3, at 913.
217. See Klawiter Testimony, supra note 5, at 6-77 (discussing how ineffective
internal compliance programs may become if corporate privileges are routinely waived).
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trust, 21 8 for "[t]rust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor-patient
relationship-the 'glue' that holds the relationship together and makes it
possible. When a physician, nurse, therapist, lab attendant or any
medical professional is forced to work in an environment in which he or she
cannot afford to be-or believes that he or she cannot afford to be-candid
220with counsel, the already healthy suspicion that many medical
professionals have for lawyers proves well founded. This type of
environment is inconsistent with the notion that trust relationships are
particularly important in the health care arena, and it puts an almost
intolerable burden on the lawyers forced to work in this environment.
22 1
D. Disincentives to Conduct Internal Investigations
The emphasis on internal compliance efforts began with SEC initiatives in
the 1970s, and other federal agencies have implemented a host of amnesty
and voluntary disclosure programs in the years since the SEC embarked on
223its pioneering efforts. These initiatives are premised on the notion that
incentivizing entities to keep their own houses in order is an effective
strategy for promoting adherence to the law and leveraging limited
government enforcement resources. This logic is inherent in the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines' incorporation of compliance and
cooperation as mitigating factors for entities facing sentencing. 224  This
218. See Hall, supra note 131, at 470-71 (citations omitted).
219. See id. at 470 (citing Huw T.O. Davies & Thomas G. Rundall, Managing Patient
Trust in Managed Care, 78 MILBANQ Q. 609, 612 (2000)).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
221. In addition, health care attorneys work in an area of legal and ethical landmines.
See Gerson & Gladieux, supra note 134, at 164; see also Lisa D. Taylor & Philip L.
Pomerance, Ethical Challenges in Everyday Practice for Healthcare Lawyers, 34 J. OF
HEALTH L. 1 (2001) (presenting numerous ethical situations confronting health care
attorneys on a regular basis); Joan H. Krause & Richard S. Saver, Ethics in the Practice
of Health Law, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 766 (2004) (arguing that health care lawyers
increasingly encounter situations in which both legal and ethical conclusions must be
drawn).
222. See Duggin, supra note 3, at 871; STEPHEN F. BLACK, INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS § 1.01, at 1-1 (1998).
223. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
224. See USSG Manual, supra note 1, at § 8C2.5; see also supra text accompanying
notes 33-43 and 101-21. The USSC's recent decisions to delete the specific reference to
waiver of attorney-client and work product protections from the commentary to § 8C2.5
does not alter the guidelines' focus on cooperation or impact the ability of federal
prosecutors, the HHS Inspector General or other law enforcement authorities to demand
privilege waivers. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 7 (quoting comments from Michael J.
Elston, DOJ official and ex-officio member of the USSC, that he "do[es] not understand
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strategy has motivated many corporations and other entities to conduct
internal investigations and to disclose legal violations, tortious occurrences
and various problematic events to government officials and other interested
parties.225
The health care sector is particularly well positioned to engage in and
benefit from internal investigation strategies in light of the long tradition of
ongoing internal quality assessment, a process that is essentially mandatory
for providers participating in JCAHO programs or other accrediting
processes.226  In the current enforcement environment, however, the
attractiveness of this tool has diminished, because not only the results, but
the entire course of an investigation - including witness statements, the
impressions of counsel, and strategic decisions - may well be disclosed to
the government, and possibly to the world in light of the aversion of many
courts to the selective waiver doctrine. 227 As the ABA Task Force on the
Attorney-Client Privilege has pointed out:
The chilling effect [of prosecutorial and regulatory agency waiver
policies] on clients' comfort level in fully disclosing to attorneys is
a significant concern. . . .As corporations become increasingly
cognizant of government agencies' policies and practices, the risk
is that corporations will respond with greater reluctance to employ
counsel or to confide fully in counsel, thereby undermining the
public objectives served by the privilege.
228
This is especially likely in an industry where trust is critical, 229 and key
players often harbor a great deal of suspicion for members of the legal
community. 23  Moreover, when internal investigations do proceed, "'much
of what [was once] put down in writing [will] remain unwritten, ' ' 23 1
adversely affecting 'the interests of clients and the cause of justice."'
232
The current enforcement milieu creates a real risk that prolonging current
government privilege waiver policies will ultimately undo much of the good
that has been done by the internal compliance initiatives of the last two
decades. In the health care sector this risk may also spill over into quality
it to be the commission's intention to advocate or promote changes in the ... [DOJ's]
policies or practices through this amendment").
225. See Duggin, supra note 3 at 884-90.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 63-79
228. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 18-19.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34 & 217.
230. See supra text accompanying note 208.
231. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981) (quoting Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)). See supra Part I.A.
232. Id.
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assurance investigations that have little if anything to do with fraud. If
medical professionals find that their fears of participation in investigations
are frequently justified, there may well be a concomitant impact on other
types of internal inquiries essential to health care quality, thereby
exacerbating the very kinds of problems state peer review privileges were
designed to combat.
E. The Necessity for Health Care Providers, Professionals and Industry
Associations to Engage in Ongoing Efforts to Protect the Corporate
A ttorney-Client Privilege
Americans attach a great deal of importance to their health as evidenced
by the significant portion of the United States economy devoted to medical
care. In 2004, the United States spent sixteen percent of its gross domestic
product, 1.9 trillion dollars, on health care.233 In light of the importance of
good health to Americans, the magnitude of health care costs, and the
political sensitivity of health care issues, it is no wonder that the laws
governing the provision of health care are so complex. It is highly unlikely
that they will become any less intricate in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, in health care-as much or more than in any other political,
social or economic arena--entities and the individuals associated with them
require the advice of legal counsel, and they need to be able to trust that both
query and advice will remain confidential. This is particularly true with
respect to requests for advice pertaining to potential wrongdoing or for
assistance with investigating suspected legal violations.
Neither providers nor medical professionals can operate effectively in the
complex, highly fragmented infrastructure of the American health care
system without the assistance of counsel. Thus, any attack on attorney-client
or work product protections strikes a particularly serious blow to health care
entities and the professionals who provide medical care in association with
them. In the long run, health care quality, efficiency of service, and fiscal
integrity are very likely to suffer if government policies continue to
undermine the attorney-client privilege and work product protections.
Given the importance of this debate, the absence of health care provider
and professional associations from much of the exchange over the attorney-
client privilege to date is remarkable. Unlike other interest groups (e.g., the
ACLU, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Chemistry Council, and the
233. This amounts to $6,280 per person. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA 1 (2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/02 NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.asp#TopOfPage; see
also CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, SNAPSHOT: HEALTH CARE COSTS 101 2-3
(2004), http://www.chcf.org/documents/insurance/HCCosts 10105.pdf.
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National Association of Manufacturers), representatives of the health care
sector have not been widely visible in proceedings before the USSC, the
ABA Task Force, or other efforts to restore and protect a strong attorney-
client privilege and robust work product protections. Yet, few groups have
so vital an interest in the continuing availability of the corporate privilege or
so compelling a story to tell as to why these protections are necessary.
The health care industry-including providers, professionals and their
associations-needs to engage in the current debate by taking on the policies
of the DOJ and other federal agencies in public fora and assisting in alerting
legislators to the problems posed when government policies undermine the
vitality of the attorney-client privilege and work product protections. In
particular, industry participants need to take advantage of opportunities to
address Congress, federal agencies, and other public entities about the
damage done by policies that sabotage these protections. Health care
providers and medical professionals have a unique story to tell, and they
represent perhaps the most important sector of our economy in both human
and financial terms. It is essential to the health of the industry itself to
protect the corporate attorney-client privilege and exercise continuing
vigilance to ensure that it remains alive and well.
CONCLUSION
Health care entities and medical professionals have a great deal at stake in
the war over the ongoing vitality of the corporate attorney-client privilege.
Without the protections of a strong attorney-client privilege and a robust
work product doctrine, the business of health care, the professionals who
provide this care, and the quality of health care services are at risk. As the
Supreme Court observed in Upjohn, "[a]n uncertain privilege. . . is little
better than no privilege at all., 234 The corporate attorney-client privilege
needs resuscitation, and the health care industry is uniquely situated to help
save it and restore its vitality. There are few industries with more at stake or
more to contribute to the cause.
234. 449 U.S. at 393. See supra text accompanying notes 14-33.
